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Abstract
Essays in Industrial Organization
Yuzhou Wang
2021
This dissertation studies a few topics in industrial organization. In the first two
chapters, I study the education market from the perspective of industrial organization.
Chapter 3 studies second-price auctions with participation costs.
Chapters 1 and 2 study the high school market of a large city in China that
introduced a policy allowing public schools to offer both free and priced admission
options within a centralized admission mechanism. Chapter 1 introduces the institu-
tional background, such as details of the admission mechanism, the schools and their
price levels, and the new policy. I then present descriptive analysis. I also estimate
a high school value-added regression, where I regress exit exam scores on entrance
exam scores and other variables. I interpret the value-added as the high school qual-
ity. Results show that quality increases after the implementation of the policy. A
difference-in-differences regression further shows that top-tier schools are able to in-
crease their value-added more. I use these results as both inputs and motivating facts
for my study in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 formally develops a demand and supply model. On the demand side,
students consider both their preferences for a school and their probabilities of be-
ing admitted to that school to file a report of preferences. I develop an algorithm
to quickly find students’ optimal reports, and this algorithm helps to reduce the
computational burden in demand estimation. On the supply side, I model schools as
maximizing a weighted average of profit and quality, so as to allow for the existence of
excess demand for good schools. Demand estimation using students’ strategic reports
quantifies the extent to which students with higher entrance exam scores care more
about quality relative to price. Supply side estimation shows that top-tier schools
have lower marginal costs of quality and thus choose higher quality. Counterfac-
tual analysis shows that introducing subsidies to low income students while keeping
the current priced admission options would give students more equal access to good
schools, while keeping the quality gain brought by market incentives. Another coun-
terfactual analysis shows that the quality gain brought by market incentives is driven
by an increase in funds to improve quality and schools’ preference for quality.
Chapter 3 studies equilibria and efficiency in second-price auctions with public
participation costs. This is joint work with José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez and Álvaro
Parra. We generalize previous results by allowing arbitrary heterogeneity in bidders’
distributions of valuations and in their participation costs. We develop a notion of
bidder strength, based on the best response of a bidder when all of her opponents
play the same strategy she does. We then show that a herculean equilibrium, in which
stronger bidders have a lower participation threshold than weaker bidders, exists in
general environments. In other words, the order of bidders given by their strength,
which is a non-equilibrium concept and can be easily calculated for each bidder using
only one equation, predicts the order of the participation thresholds in a certain equi-
librium which exists in general. Combined with a sufficient condition for equilibrium
uniqueness that we further provide, bidders’ strength points out the direction for
finding and simplifies the formulation of the equilibrium. Furthermore, even though
all equilibria are ex-post inefficient, an ex-ante efficient equilibrium always exists.
Therefore, under the uniqueness condition, the herculean equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium of the game and is ex-ante efficient.
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Chapter 1
Introducing Prices to Public School
Assignment: Institutional
Background and Empirical Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Market incentives have been introduced to many school systems around the world,
with goals such as promoting school quality and equalizing student access. One of
these policies, although not tried in the U.S. to my knowledge, is to allow public
schools to offer paid admission options. Such a policy has been tried in China and is
the subject of my empirical work.
From the supply perspective, allowing schools to charge tuition may create incen-
tives for improvements in school quality (Betts and Tang (2011); Mizala and Torche
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(2012)).1 Such improvements in quality would not only benefit those who pay tuition
to be admitted, but would also benefit those who do not pay. From the demand
perspective, the availability of paid admission options may allow students to better
express their preferences over price and quality (Harris et al. (2015)). However, such
a policy may also undermine the goal of equal access to good schools by favoring
those with greater ability to pay. Some existing theoretical and empirical literature
has suggested similar concerns (Epple and Romano (2012); Hanushek et al. (2016);
Manski (1992)). Most students prefer schools with higher value added, which allows
such schools to charge higher prices. This, in turn, allows schools with higher value
added to collect more funds and to increase school value added even further. As a
result, the gap in school value-added may grow, with richer students better able to
access better schools.
I study education markets from the perspective of industrial organization to un-
derstand the equilibrium effects on school quality and equal access of introducing
prices to public-school systems.
Specifically, I capture two key features that differentiate education markets from
other commonly studied industries. First and foremost, there are usually excess de-
mand, typically for some top schools, in education markets. Although education
services resemble other consumer goods in the dimension of being both vertical and
horizontal differentiated, its vertical attribute, namely, the quality of a school, usu-
ally plays a more important role and a school with high quality can not be easily
1. Some researchers have studied how school choices induced competition affects school outcome.
See Hoxby (2003) and Rothstein (2006) for an example
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substituted. While this brings good schools huge demand and local or even global
market powers, capacity constraints usually means that not all students can be ad-
mitted to their most preferred school. This, in turn, induces the introduction of
various centralized assignment or decentralized matching mechanisms, either by the
government or school themselves. As a result, students’ true preferences are usually
entangled with their beliefs and strategies in most markets. Second, the existence of
excess demand also implies that schools are not pure profit maximizers and they also
care about other things, such as their reputations of high quality. The emphasize
on quality by both students and schools also means that it is crucial to understand
schools’ marginal cost of producing quality.
The high school market of a large city in China that is characterized by these two
features provides a representative environment to study the impact of introducing
price to public-school systems. Several other attractive settings of this market further
makes it suitable for the purpose of this study. All high schools, public or private,
have to admit students through a centralized admission mechanism. Although private
schools are not major players in this market, it nonetheless allows me to incorporate
all schools into the model instead of treating private schools as outside options. Still,
public schools are the major players in the market and are the focus of this study.
The city introduced a policy allowing individual public schools to offer both free and
paid admission options. These options are treated as different non-exclusive choices,
and students can apply for both within the centralized admission mechanism.
Descriptive analysis shows that, after schools are allowed to charge tuition, many
but not all schools choose to offer the paid admission options over the years, the
3
number of students admitted through such options increases over time, and the tuition
increases too. Using a data set on high school entry and exit exam scores, a value-
added regression shows that school value-added in test scores increases after the
implementation of the policy.2 Moreover, a difference-in-differences regression shows
that top-tier schools are able to increase their value-added more, when compared to
middle-tier and bottom-tier schools.3 I use such results as both input to the demand
model and motivating facts for the supply model, so as to explain why different schools
choose different quality and to study the distributional implication of the policy.
I collect data on students’ reports of school preferences. Students are allowed
to rank a limited number of schools in a report that they must file before taking
the entrance exam. Thus, students need to be strategic,4 considering not only their
true preferences but also their beliefs about admission probabilities. Students’ exam
scores are a crucial part in the centralized admission mechanism, which is a variation
of serial dictatorship. This setting is different from the commonly studied setting
of K-12 school admissions in the U.S. The students’ ranking scores in such settings,
which determines whom to be considered first, depends on their school district, status
of their siblings, and their reports, instead of students’ talents (Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez (2003)).5
2. Other research also tries to compare performances of public schools and private schools. See
Altonji et al. (2005) and Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2011) for an example.
3. Each high school is categorized into top-tier, middle-tier or bottom-tier by the government and
such categorization didn’t change in the time period of my study. More details about this in later
sections.
4. Some researchers have shown that some students are strategic under other mechanisms too; see
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) and Calsamiglia and Guell (2013) for an example.
5. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) and Pathak and Sönmez (2013) for more details about ad-
4
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces basic insti-
tutional backgrounds of this study, followed by a detailed explanation of the data I
collected in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes some stylized facts from the data and
estimates school valued-added in test scores, which is both an input to the demand
model and an motivating fact to the supply model. Section 1.5 concludes this chapter.
1.2 Institutional Background
In this paper, I study the high school market in a northern city in China. Since 2006,
public high schools in this city are allowed to offer both free and priced admission
options. As a result, there are three possible channels for students to be admitted to a
high school: free tuition, low tuition, and high tuition, the first two of which already
exist before the new policy. Schools can choose whether to have the high tuition
channel. In fact only schools good enough choose to have it. The price of high tuition
varies between around 20,000 RMB and 50,000 RMB for three years. The price of low
tuition varies between around 5,000 RMB and 20,000 RMB. The average individual
income is around 40,000 RMB in this period. When schools choose to have the high
tuition channel, they will also choose the number of possible seats of students to admit
through this channel. However, this choice is highly regulated by the government.
After students are admitted, their admission channels don’t matter: each student
has the same opportunity to be assigned to different small classes. Schools don’t
mission mechanisms such as Boston mechanism in the US. See Lise et al. (2004), Todd and Wolpin
(2006), Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), and Pathak and Shi (2014) for use of data from random social
experiments, lab experiments, or regime shifts.
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systematically assign good teachers to students admitted through free tuition channels
or high tuition channels. This means that the education services, teaching quality
more specifically, are the same for different channels. Only the price is different for
different channels within the same school.
Each high school is categorized by the government into top tier, middle tier, or
bottom tier. Top-tier high schools are seen as the ones with the best quality, and all
of them have all three possible channels (free, low, high tuition) to admit students.
Most middle-tier schools have all three possible channels, but with lower prices for
low and high tuition channels than those of top-tier schools. Bottom-tier schools only
have free and low tuition channels to admit students. Each tier has about 10 high
schools. Table 1.1 below summarizes price levels for different channels and school
tiers.
Table 1.1: Price levels for school tiers and channels
RMB Free Low High
Top tier 0 ∼ 18, 000 ∼ 48, 000
Middle tier 0 ∼ 15, 000 ∼ 36, 000
Bottom tier 0 ∼ 8, 000 NA
Middle school graduates file a rank-ordered list of their preferences over school-
channels before they take the High School Entrance Exam. Each school-channel is
listed as one possible choice. The list of 16 ordered choices should be filled according
to some specific rules that require students to choose from a certain subset of school
channels for each spot in the list. Such subsets are exclusive and exhaustive and are
based on school tiers and channels. For example, for the very first spot in the list,
students can only choose from free tuition channels of top-tier high schools; for the
6
second and third spots, they can only choose from low tuition channels of top-tier
schools; for the fourth and fifth spots, they can choose from free tuition channels of
middle-tier schools. And for spots from sixth to tenth, they can choose from high
tuition channels of top-tier schools, low tuition and high tuition channels of middle-
tier schools, and free and low tuition channels of bottom-tier schools. See Table 1.2
below for an illustration. Thus, such rank-ordered preference list is divided into
sub-lists and truncated for each sub-list.
Table 1.2: An illustration of how school
tiers and channels are allocated in the
report
Slots Free Low High
Top tier 1 2, 3 6− 10
Middle tier 4, 5 6− 10 6− 10
Bottom tier 6− 10 6− 10 NA
For example, a school-channel that is from top-
tier school and free should be reported in the
1st slot. A school-channel that is from a top-
tier school and low price should be reported in
the 2nd and 3rd slot.
After the exam scores are revealed, students are assigned to school channels by
serial dictatorship mechanism: students are admitted one by one, from the highest
score to the lowest score, to their most preferred school channel that has not been
filled up yet when it is her turn. The mechanism is not a pure serial dictatorship due
to the fact that the list is divided and truncated. Thus, such admission mechanism is
not strategy-proof. When reporting preference lists, students consider not only their
utilities from school-channels but also the probabilities that they will be admitted.




I collect three sets of data. The first set is high school entrance exam data from 2007
to 2016. For each year, the data set includes a random 60% sample from the full
population. Each observation includes the student’s full reported rank-ordered list of
preferred school channels, the high school entrance exam total scores together with
scores for each of the seven subjects, the school channel admitted, the middle school
attended, and personal information such as gender, race, and DOB. It also includes
a personal identifier. For each year, there are approximately 15,000 observations.
The second set of data is high school exit exam data from 2007 to 2016 except
2011 and 2015. For each year, the data set includes the full population of those
who graduate from high schools, corresponding to matriculating cohorts from 2004
to 2013. Only students from current cohort are included; those who spend another
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year in high school after high school graduation are excluded. Such students spend
another year in the same or a different high school to take the high school exit exam,
a.k.a., the college entrance exam, more than once, with the hope of being admitted
to a better college. I exclude such students since they study at possibly more than
one high schools for more than three years. Each observation includes the high school
exit exam, a.k.a., the college entrance exam, total scores together with scores for each
of the four subjects. It also includes gender, race, DOB and a personal identifier. For
each year, there are approximately 15,000 observations. I use the personal identifier
to match the entrance exam data and the exit exam data, and it gives about 9,000
observations for each year.
The third set of data is high school-channel characteristics. This includes the price
and number of seats for each school channel. I also calculate distance from each high
school to each middle school. Since students are assigned to the middle school that
is closest to her home, I use the distance between middle schools and high schools as
a proxy for the distance from students’ home to high schools.
I construct a data set of 5 years by matching the above three data sets. It covers




After high schools are allowed to offer paid admission options with high prices, top-
tier schools increase their total number of seats in general and the number of seats in
high tuition channels increases in general too. Figure 1.2 shows that top-tier schools
have a larger market share over the years, while both middle-tier and bottom-tier
schools shrink. This means top-tier schools have much larger number of seats and
are expanding, since each tier has about the same number of schools and the total
number of students increases slightly over the time period.
Figure 1.2 also shows that only top-tier schools can effectively attract a significant
number of students to pay for their high tuition channels, and that the percentage
of students admitted through high tuition channels is increasing over the years (the
green bars).
Figure 1.3 shows that the average price of top-tier schools (weighted by the number
of students in each school-channel) increases significantly over the years while the
average price of middle-tier and bottom-tier schools stays roughly the same.
1.4.2 Quality estimation
I estimate the teaching quality for each school-year and examine whether the teaching
quality changes in each high school after they are allowed to offer paid admission
options with high prices.
There is large literature on how to measure teaching quality, such as Abdulka-
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Figure 1.2: Change in number of seats for channels with different price
diroğlu et al. (2019) and Rockoff and Turner (2010). I use the matched data to
estimate a value-added model and interpret the value-added as schools’ quality.
ExitScoreijt = EntryScoreijtγ1 +Xijtγ2 +HighSchooljt
+MiddleSchoolk + percentileAtEntryijtγ3 + vijt
ExitScore is student i’s total score of college entrance exam (high school exit
exam). EntryScore is a vector of all seven subject scores of her high school entrance
exam, which are Chinese, math, English, physics, chemistry, history, and political
science. X are demographic variables which include gender and race of the student.
HighSchool is a dummy for each high school-year. MiddleSchool is a dummy for
each middle school. percentileAtEntry is the percentile of a student’s total entrance
exam score within the high school she is admitted to. I include this variable to account
11
Figure 1.3: Change in average price of schools in different tiers
for the possible concern that students may benefit from an environment where they
are the star and can be more confident. Similar ideas are also exploited in Kapor
(2015).
EntryScore is normalized by each subject for each year based on the score distri-
bution of the whole student body of the city. ExitScore is standardized for each year
based on the score distribution of the whole province which the city is in. Since the
difficulty of the exam varies year by year, it’s better to standardize exam scores year
by year rather than pooling several years together. Ideally, I would like to normal-
ize EntryScore based on the distribution of the province too. But the high school
entrance exam of this city is separate from the exam of the province. Students from
outside this city don’t take the exam of this city. Thus, there is no way to fairly
compare scores across the whole province. The exit exam (college entrance exam),
12
however, is the same for every student from the province, and the exam scores are
comparable. I choose to standardize the ExitScore by the score distribution of the
province instead of the city. In this way, high school value-added is not a mere rela-
tive comparison between schools within a specific year. It can also be allowed to be
compared across years.
I interpret the coefficient on HighSchooljt as the teaching quality of high school j
at year t. There might be concerns of selection in this regression. Ideally, I would like
to control for more student characteristics, for example, family income and parents’
education level. However, I couldn’t do this due to data limitations. I do control for
the middle school a student attends. Since students are assigned to middle schools
based on proximity of their home to the school, MiddleSchool not only controls for
the value-added from the middle school, but also controls for, at least to some extent,
the income level in that neighborhood. Another explanatory variable that is of our
interest is peer effect or student composition. However, the observation of student
composition is at the school level, and will lead to collinearity problems if I want to
include it in the value-added regression.
For simplicity, I show a part of the results in Table 1.3 to give a sense of what
is happening. The benchmark is high school with code 7907 in year 2007. This is a
bottom-tier high school.
High school hs7701 hs7703 are top-tier high schools, and hs7701 is actually the
very top school within the top-tier. It is the very first school to have the high tuition
channel. hs7705 hs7901 are middle-tier schools and have high tuition channels at a
rather late time, and charge lower prices than top-tier schools. hs7003 hs7709 are
13
Table 1.3: High school quality estimation
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
hs7701 1.551 1.472 1.826 1.710 1.665 1.700
hs7703 1.157 1.123 1.151 1.166 1.205 1.374
hs7705 0.878 0.757 0.718 0.954 0.909 0.876
hs7901 0.608 0.613 0.668 0.658 0.813 0.862
hs7003 0.229 0.075 0.129 0.151 0.179 0.223
hs7709 0.187 −0.075 0.057 0.137 0.288 0.114
bottom-tier schools and never choose to have the high tuition channels.
The first column reflects the fact that top-tier schools have the highest value-added
and bottom-tier schools have the lowest value-added. Such pattern doesn’t change
over the years.
For school hs7701, the value-added increases first and then decreases a little bit
and then stays roughly the same. The value-added does increase after it starts to
have a high tuition channel. The value-added does not increase further because it
has already reached its capacity to collect tuition. It has already charged the highest
price and admitted the maximum amount of students that the government allows.
For school hs7703, it starts its high tuition channel later than hs7701 and it
increases its price and number of admitted students over the years. As a result, its
value-added keeps increasing.
For middle-tier school hs7705 and hs7901, the value-added are increasing, but at
a lower magnitude than those of top-tier schools, possibly due to the fact that they
charge lower prices and admit fewer students through high tuition channels.
For bottom-tier school hs7003 and 7709, the value-added doesn’t change much or
even decreases, as expected, since they have no high tuition channels and can not
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collect more money to increase their teaching quality.
1.4.3 Quality change across school tiers
To further look into the changes in school value-added across time and different
school tiers, I run the following regression with q being the value-added estimated
from above:







αt,MDt ×MiddleT ierj +
∑
t
αt,BDt ×BottomTierj + εjt
MiddleT ier is an indicator and equals 1 if the school is a middle-tier school. Similar
for BottomTier. Dt is an indicator for year t. The benchmark is then top-tier high
schools in year 2007. Schools in different tiers have different abilities to collect money
through paid admission options. The results are presented in Table 1.4. And the
Table 1.4: Quality change
αtk Top Middle Bottom
2007 1.005∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗
2009 −0.090 −0.012 −0.065
2010 0.187 −0.334. −0.269
2011 0.230 −0.295. −0.238
2013 0.242 −0.240 −0.137
result is shown in Figure 1.4 too, where the value plotted is the value-added. For
example, for bottom-tier year 2013, its α2007,T + α2007,B + α2013,T + α2013,B
The results show a few things. First, comparing the first row of the table, we see
value-added differences are quite significant across school tiers at year 2007. Second,
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Figure 1.4: Change in teaching quality of schools in different tiers
the blue line in Figure 1.4 shows that the teaching quality for the bottom-tier schools
increases a little in later years but barely changes when compared to 2007. Such
schools do not have quality high enough to attract students so as to take full advantage
of the paid admission options. Actually, their good teachers may even be recruited
to other schools with better salaries. At last, the red line of Figure 1.4 shows that
top-tier schools’ value-added increases faster than that of middle-tier and bottom-tier
schools, and the differences between them are spreading. This reflects the fact that
top-tier schools have the strongest ability to attract students and to take the full
advantage of the paid admission options to collect tuition which can then be used to
increase teaching quality.
But notice that although the difference of value-added among schools are spread-
ing, no category shows a significant reduction in quality. We also need to take into
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account the fact that after schools are allowed to offer paid admission options with
high prices, more students go to top-tier schools, leaving bottom-tier schools shrink-
ing. This means that the total social gain from quality improvements may be even
larger than the figure above suggests.
All results above, however, have not taken into account of family income, which
is not in my data. In order to better understand the role of family income and
its interaction with school demand, I need to turn to structural models which will
allow me to simulate family income in the counterfactual analysis. More importantly,
estimating a structural model will allow me better understand why different schools
choose different levels of quality.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide institutional background for the high school market that
is at the center of my study, and examine empirical evidence of the impact of allow-
ing public high schools to offer both free and priced admission options. Descriptive
evidence shows that after the implementation of the policy, seats from high price
channels account for a larger share over the years. Using a data set on high school
entry and exit exam scores that I collect, I estimate a value-added regression, and
interpret the value-added as high school teaching quality. The results show that after
the implementation of the policy, teaching quality measured by value-added increases
over time.
Furthermore, a difference-in-differences regression shows that such increase in
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teaching quality is not distributed equally among schools. Top-tier high schools with
better ability to attract students and to collect tuition are more likely to have a larger
increase in teaching quality.
To fully understanding of the impact of the policy on teaching quality and on




Introducing Prices to Public School
Assignment: Structural Model and
Counterfactual
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I build and structurally estimate a model of school choice by students
from the demand side and of quality choice by schools from the supply side. It allows
me to understand students’ heterogeneous demand and schools’ behaviors that are
in a different environment from a traditional consumer goods market. Furthermore,
the counterfactual analysis provides insights into to why introducing price leads to
quality change and what can be done to address the adverse impact on equal access.
Using the data set of students’ strategic reports, as described in Chapter 1, I
estimate students’ true school preferences and beliefs about admission probabilities. I
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allow students’ beliefs to depend on a noisy signal of their test scores. I allow students
with different characteristics to have different preferences over school characteristics
such as quality and price. An important student characteristic is the signal of their
exam scores. I allow students with different signals to have different preferences.
Although the signal is not observable to the researcher, the true score is, making
the preference coefficients random from the perspective of the econometrician. The
spread of the characteristics between the first and the last reported schools on the
list is useful to identify the variance of the noisy signal. Since I observe reports of
each student, interactions between observed student and school characteristics help
to identify important utility parameters.
I estimate the demand parameters using the method of simulated moments, to-
gether with an algorithm I propose to find optimal reports for individual students.
This algorithm exploits two properties of optimal reports under a serial dictatorship
mechanism. Specifically, I show that both cutoffs and utilities of the schools reported
on the list should be decreasing with the order of the spots if the report is optimal.
This algorithm also works for a range of mechanisms where the ranking score of an
applicant does not depend on her exact report. My demand estimation shows that
students with higher exam scores care more about quality relative to price.
From the supply side, I model schools to care about a weighted average between
profit and its quality, so as to incorporate the facts that schools may want to keep
excess demand in the market. To better understand schools choice of quality, I explic-
itly model schools’ marginal costs of producing quality as being quadratic in quality.
This not only captures the fact that producing quality is more and more costly with
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higher level quality, but also allows for the problem of choosing optimal quality to
be well-behaved. I combine such models of school competition with the demand side
to estimate the marginal costs of different schools. My results show that top-tier
schools have lower marginal costs of producing quality and will choose higher levels
of teaching quality.
The estimated demand and supply models allow me to run counterfactual analysis
and examine the impact of different policy changes. The first set of counterfactual is
to study how introducing subsidies to students from low income families can impact
their chances to be admitted to top-tier schools. Results show that 20% of students
from the poorest 10% families are admitted to top-tier schools when there is no subsidy
at all. As a comparison, 92% of students from the richest 10% families are admitted
to top-tier schools in this scenario. When I introduce tuition subsidies to low income
students of up to RMB 24,000, which can be used to cover tuition, 43% of students
from the poorest 10% families are admitted to top-tier schools, and the percentage for
students from the richest 10% families drops to 77%. When the tuition subsidy is up
to RMB 50,000, the percentage for students from the poorest 10% families that are
admitted to top-tier schools further rises to 57%, while the percentage for students
from the richest 10% families further drops to 64%. This shows that introducing
subsidies to low income students while keeping the current priced admission options
would give students more equal access to better schools.
I run another counterfactual where I set the price of high tuition channel to the
price of the low tuition channel of the same school. I then decompose the optimal
quality and compare it with the decomposition of quality under current policy so
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as to understand where the quality gain brought by introducing prices comes from.
Using top-tier schools as an example, the results show that the increase in price of
the high tuition channel leads to an increase in quality of 0.149 standard deviation
(s.d.) of test scores. Out of this amount, the increase in price in a competitive setting
brings a increase in quality of 1.042 s.d., driven by increase in price; the linear quality
markdown brings a decrease in quality of 1.187 s.d., driven by the decrease of demand
elasticity with respect to quality when the price increases; the quadratic markdown
brings a decrease of 0.013 s.d., in a smaller scale when compared to previous two
terms; and finally, the preference markup gives an increase in quality of 0.307 s.d.,
bringing the total change in quality to the positive territory.
Although this paper, to my best knowledge, is the first to study both demand and
supply sides of education markets with excess demand and the effects of introducing
to prices to public schools, it builds on previous research on related topics. The
first strand of related research focuses on the topic of the effects of market incentives
on education markets. Research by Manski (1992) and Epple and Romano (2008)
pioneered the theoretical analysis of the effects of voucher programs. Azevedo and
Leshno (2016) extend the discrete Gale-Shapley framework to an environment of a
continuum of students to study the effects of school competitions. There is also
research that use tools from industrial organization to study education markets, such
as Neilson (2013) and Allende (2019). Both of them study the primary school markets
in Chile with different focus from this paper. Neilson (2013) focus on the effectiveness
of a voucher program while Allende (2019) focus on the social interaction among
students.
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The second strand of related literature studies the demand estimation from strate-
gic reports. The two articles most closely related to this paper are Agarwal and
Somaini (2018) and Calsamglia et al. (2018).1 Agarwal and Somaini (2018) study
the strategic reports of students under Boston Mechanism and interpret students’
problem as finding the combination of schools that maximize expected utility. They
rigorously formulate the problem, show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium,
the identification of the problem, and provide a roadmap of estimation. Calsamglia
et al. (2018), on the other hand, exploit the two properties of the admission mecha-
nisms, namely, sequentiality of spots in nature and reducible history, to simplify the
problem. In terms of utility model setup, this paper follows the traditional IO litera-
ture to include interaction between student characteristics and school characteristics
and allows for random coefficients of students’ preferences. This extends Agarwal
and Somaini (2018) and Calsamglia et al. (2018), both of which rely on fixed coeffi-
cients. This paper borrows and combines the ideas of Berry et al. (2004), Agarwal
and Somaini (2018), Berry and Haile (2014) and Berry and Haile (2020) to identify
the variance of the noisy signal and important utility parameters. While this paper
adapts part of Agarwal and Somaini (2018)’s first part of estimation procedure to
gain an estimation of admission probabilities conditional on an parameter to be es-
timated, I depart from them in the estimation of demand parameters. I exploit two
properties of optimal reports under serial dictatorship to reduce the computational
burden of finding the optimal reports, as briefly mentioned above.
1. Other research about estimation of the equilibrium under mechanisms and settings less relevant
to this paper includes, for example, De Haan et al. (2015), He (2015) and Hwang (2016).
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The third strand of literature focuses on understanding supply side behavior in the
education markets. Fu (2014) and Kapor (2015) both study college admission and the
matching problem. Fu (2014) takes quality as given and explores how colleges choose
admission policy and tuition levels in the market to maximize a weighted average
between revenue and students’ ability. This paper differs from this to model schools
as maximizing a weighted average between profit and school quality, which makes
more sense in the centralized admission mechanism where schools cannot choose stu-
dents and their only way to attract students is through increasing desirable product
characteristics such as quality. While Allende (2019) explicitly models marginal cost
of quality, this paper further models the marginal cost to be quadratic in quality, a
more realistic model which allows one to explain the existence of excess demand.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the demand
model and its estimation. Section 2.3 discusses the supply model and its estimation.
Section 2.4 presents results, and Section 2.5 presents counterfactual analysis and
Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Model of School Choice by Students
2.2.1 Timeline of admission
As discussed above, students first file their reports, and then take the high school
entrance exam. After the exam scores are revealed, each student is assigned one by
one, from the one with the highest score to the one with the lowest score, to their most
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preferred school-channel that has not been filled up yet. Since the rank-ordered list
is divided into sub-list, and each sub-list is truncated, students need to be strategic,
and consider both their true utilities and their beliefs about admission probabilities
of different school-channels. Both of these are potentially related to students’ scores:
students with higher exam scores are more likely to be admitted to better schools,
and demand of students with higher signals of exam scores may be more sensitive to
teaching quality, and less sensitive to price and distance. However, students don’t
know their true exam scores si when they file their preference lists. They only know
a noisy signal ai of the true score, which I model as:
ai = si + ei
where si is the total score of the high school entrance exam for student i, and the
white noise ei is independent of s and is normally distributed ei ∼ N(0, σ2e).
2.2.2 Students’ objective and choices
A student’s objective is to maximize her expected utility by choosing which school-
channels to fill in the rank-ordered preference list. The utility of student i from being
admitted through school-channel j is
uij = βiXij + εij
= (β0 + aiβ1 + ziβ2)Xij + εij
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where school-channel characteristics Xij includes dij, the distance from student i’s
home to high school j, measured by the distance between the middle school and
high school she attends; and price-income term log(incomei − pj) of school-channel
pj. Notice that I do not observe individual income but I observe a distribution of
income instead. I will simulate income in the demand estimation. Xij also includes
the teaching quality of school j in year t qjt, which is the value added I estimated
from above. More importantly, I assume students with different scores may have
different preferences over school-channel characteristics. Students’ tastes over school-
channel characteristics also depend on student characteristics, which include their
race, gender, and the middle school the student attends.
I assume that the random term εij is i.i.d and follows N(0, 1). I normalize the
variance to 1 to normalize the scale of the utility. I also assume ε is orthogonal to
other variables. The outside option of high school-channels is vocational high schools.
In this paper, I always talk about academic high school-channels whenever I do not
specifically point it out as vocational high schools. I normalize the utility of the
outside option to zero.
Let LjRi,ai denote the probability student i will be admitted to school-channel j
when her signal of score is ai and her preference report is Ri. Let LRi,ai be the vector
of probability of admission for all possible school channels.
The student’s objective is then to find a report Ri such that
ui · LRi,ai ≥ ui · LR′i,ai ,∀R
′
i ∈ Ri (2.1)
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where ui is the utility vector and Ri is the set of all possible reports for i.
2.2.3 Beliefs about admission probabilities
Let σ denote the preference reporting strategies taken by students. Such strategies will
affect what school-channels they end up reporting on their preference rank ordered
list, and will in turn decide the cutoff scores of admission for each school-channel.
Thus, when considering how to fill their preference lists before the exam, students
will form their beliefs of assignment probabilities from their beliefs about the cutoffs
of each school channel, which in turn requires students to have a belief about the
reporting strategy of other students and have a belief of the distribution of scores of
other students.
I assume students have rational expectations of other students’ reporting strategy
σ and the population distribution of signals a.
Let Φnij((Ri, ai), (R−i, a−i)) denote the probability that, given the cutoffs, which
are determined given the report of other students R−i and their signals a−i, student
i will be admitted to school-channel j when her own signal is ai and her own report
is Ri. n denotes the total number of students. Then,
Φnik =

0 for k /∈ Ri∫
Pr(ck−1 > si > ck|c, ai)de−i for k ∈ Ri
where k−1 denotes the school-channel listed ahead of school-channel k on the report
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list and ck denotes the cutoff for school-channel k. Then, by definition,
Ln,σRi,ai = Eσ,a[Φ
n
i ((Ri, ai), (R−i, a−i))|Ri, ai] (2.2)
which takes into account a student’s belief of other students’ reporting strategy σ and
belief of other students’ signals of scores a.
2.2.4 Properties of optimal reports & finding optimal reports
While the admission mechanism in my setting is a variation of serial dictatorship
mechanism, it doesn’t change the key feature of it: the reported schools are considered
one by one from the one in the first spot to the one in the last spot, and that the
report does not change the ranking score which gives the sequence to assign students.
Together with the rational expectation assumption, this gives two properties of the
optimal reports in such mechanisms.
Property. Under the serial dictatorship or variations of it where schools are con-
strained to be reported in certain spots, if students have rational expectations of the
distribution of other students’ signal and reporting strategies, then the schools listed
on the optimal report have
(1) decreasing cutoffs from the first spot to the last spot and
(2) decreasing utilities from the first spot to the last spot
Proof. The assumption of rational expectation means that students will have a ratio-
nal expectation for the cutoffs of each school. When the number of students is large,
then the distribution of the cutoffs will degenerate to the true cutoffs. Thus, students
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with rational expectation see the cutoffs with no randomness and rationally expect
the true cutoffs.
In the serial dictatorship or variations of it where schools are constrained to be
reported in certain spots, schools are considered in order from the school in the
first spot to the school in the last spot. I prove that schools listed have decreasing
cutoffs using contradiction. Suppose there exists an optimal report where there exists
two spots on the list, k and j with k < j, such that the school reported in the
k-th spot has lower cutoff than the school reported in the j-th spot, denoted by
cutoff(k) < cutoff(j). Then, if the student is not admitted until the j-th spot,
it means that the student’s score s is lower than cutoff(k), which is smaller than
cutoff(j). This means that the probability of being admitted to school (j) is 0. To
leave spot j empty will give the same expected utility to the student. This, in turn,
is dominated by fill the j-th spot with schools with lower cutoff than that reported
on the j − 1 spot. This means that the original report cannot be optimal.
Similarly, I use contradiction to show that on the optimal report schools are listed
with decreasing utilities. Suppose there exists an optimal report where there exists
two spots on the list, k and k + 1, such that the school reported in the k-th spot has
lower utilities for the student than the school reported in the k + 1-th spot, denoted
by ui(k) < ui(k+1). Since cutoff(k) < cutoff(k+1), as I have established above, the
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following will be true
ui(k)P(cutoff(k) ≤ s < cutoff(k−1)) + ui(k+1)P(cutoff(k+1) ≤ s < cutoff(k))
< ui(k+1)P(cutoff(k+1) ≤ s < cutoff(k−1))
where the left hand side represents the report being considered, and the right hand
side represents the report where the student leave the k-th spot empty. Since reports
on all other spots are unchanged, this means that the original report cannot be
optimal. Since each two consecutive spots have decreasing utilities in the optimal
report, the full report also has decreasing utilities. 
I propose an algorithm where I exploit these two properties to find optimal reports
for individual students. To give the general idea of the algorithm, I will first focus
on the traditional serial dictatorship mechanism where there is one full-list with no
sub-lists.
1. Only consider schools with positive utilities, and delete all schools with non-
positive utilities
2. For all the schools left after step 1, list them from the one with the highest
cutoff to the one with the lowest cutoff
3. Start with the last school on current list, i.e., the one with the lowest cutoff,
denote it as school [n]. Compare the utilities of school [n] and school [n − 1],
the (n − 1)-th school on the current list, i.e., the one with the second lowest
cutoff. If ui[n−1] ≤ ui[n], delete school [n− 1] from the current list; otherwise, do
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nothing. Move on to school [n− 2], if ui[n−2] ≤ ui[n], delete school [n− 2] from
the current list; otherwise, do nothing. Continue until school [1] is compared
with school [n].
4. For schools on the current list, denote the last one as school [m], since after step
3, the total number of schools left on the list might change. But it is still the
same school as school [n] from step 3. Start with the second but last school on
the current list, [m− 1], and compare the utilities of school [m− 1] and school
[m−2]. If ui[m−2] ≤ ui[m−1], delete school [m−2] from the current list; otherwise,
do nothing. Move on to school [m−3], if ui[m−3] ≤ ui[m−1], delete school [m−3]
from the current list; otherwise, do nothing. Continue until school [1] on the
current list is compared with school [m− 1].
5. Continue similar procedures until no more schools can be deleted. The list left
is one with decreasing utilities.
6. If the length of the current list is no larger than the total number of spots on
the report, then report the current list. The current list is optimal.
7. If the length of the current list is larger than the total number of spots on the
report, consider all possible ways of deleting schools from the current list to
make it fit the number of spots allowed on the report. Find the one with the
highest expected utilities.2
The general idea of the algorithm is to first find a list, as long as possible, with
2. To further simplify step 7, one may also try to exploit the two properties discovered by Cal-
samglia et al. (2018).
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decreasing cutoffs. Then use the property of decreasing utilities to eliminate schools
from the list, so that I only need to consider a smaller set of possible combinations of
schools to report. Usually, the longer the list after step 2, the more school channels
we can eliminate in steps 3-5, and the smaller the set of possible combinations of
schools will be in step 7. This will significantly reduce the computational burden.
The above algorithm can be further adapted to be applied to my current case
with sub-lists. Under the admission mechanism in my study, school-channels are
categorized into different sub-groups. The report is divided into several sub-reports.
To fill the spots on the first sub-report, students have to choose school-channels from
the first group. To fill the spots on the second sub-report, students have to choose
school-channels from the second group, etc. The first report is listed before the
second report, etc. To find the optimal report under such mechanism, the idea is
still to exploit the two properties, namely, decreasing cutoffs and decreasing utilities.
The difficulty, however, comes from the fact that I cannot list schools freely in step
2 in the above algorithm, since the order of sub-groups are given. I adapt step 2 as
follows.
1. Same as above.
2. The goal is to find a list with decreasing cutoffs.
(a) Consider all school-channels in the first sub-group, list them from the one
with the highest cutoff to the one with the lowest cutoffs. Do the same
for all school-channels within each sub-group. For each sub-group, I have
a sub-list with decreasing cutoffs.
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(b) To form one possible full list with decreasing cutoffs, list all school-channels
from the first sub-list. Then, for the second sub-list, delete all school-
channels with higher cutoffs than the cutoff of the last school-channel in
the first sub-list; list the rest from the second sub-list after the first sub-
list. For the third sub-list, delete all school-channels with higher cutoffs
than the cutoff of the last school-channel in the second sub-list; list the
rest from the third sub-list after the second sub-list. Continue until all
sub-list are considered. Now, I get a full list with decreasing cutoffs.
(c) To form another possible full list with with decreasing cutoffs, list all but
the last school-channels from the first sub-list. Then, for the second sub-
list, delete all school-channels with higher cutoffs than the cutoff of the
second but last school-channel in the first sub-list, which is also the last
school-channel on the current full list that I am filling; list the rest from
the second sub-list after the current full list that I am filling. For the third
sub-list, delete all school-channels with higher cutoffs than the cutoff of
the last school-channel in the second sub-list; list the rest from the third
sub-list after the second sub-list. Continue until all sub-list are considered.
Now, I get another full list with decreasing cutoffs.
(d) Go through similar procedures in step 2(c) to exploit all possible full lists
with decreasing cutoffs.
3. For each possible full list I get after step 2(d), go through step 3-5 in the original
algorithm to find a full list with decreasing utilities.
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4. For each possible full list I get after step 3, if the length of each sub-list of this
full list is no longer than the number of spots allowed in the sub-report, do
nothing; the current full list is a candidate for the optimal report.
5. For each possible full list I get after step 3, if the length of some sub-list of this
full list is longer than the number of spots allowed in the sub-report, consider
all possible ways of deleting schools from the current sub-list to make it fit
the number of spots allowed on the sub-report. Find the one with the highest
expected utilities. This is another candidate for the optimal report.
6. For each possible full list I get after step 3, I now have a full report after
step 4 and 5. These are candidates for the optimal report. Compare among
such candidates and find the one with the highest expected utility. This is the
optimal report.
The general idea of the adapted algorithm is still to first find a list, as long
as possible, with decreasing cutoffs. Then use the property of decreasing utilities to
eliminate schools from the list, so that I only need to consider a smaller set of possible
combinations of schools to report. The additional work is to find all possible list with
decreasing cutoffs in step 2, given the constraints on reporting rules. Usually, the
fewer the number of sub-groups, the less possibilities to consider in step 2, the longer
the list after step 2, the more school channels we can eliminate in steps 3.
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2.2.5 Identification
The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Agarwal and Somaini (2018). They show
that the equilibrium is unique if schools are weak substitutes and are locally con-
nected substitutes. These two conditions hold in my case, since there is no sub-group
of school-channels where they only substitute within the sub-group. Thus, the equi-
librium is unique.
What I observe is students’ report Ri and true exam score si. I will use the
method of simulated moments to match three sets of predicted moments to their
data counterpart. Specifically, the first set of moments is the covariances between
the observed first-choice school-channel characteristics, Xij, and the observed stu-
dents’ attributes, si and zi. This is useful to identify β1 β2, the coefficients on the
interactions between school characteristics and student characteristics. The second
set of moments is the covariances between the first-choice school-channel character-
istics and the last-choice school-channel characteristics. Since each student knows ai
and guesses si|ai, the larger σ2e > 0, the more spread si|ai will be, the more spread
between the characteristics of the first and last school-channel reported. Thus, such
moments will help to identify the variance σ2e > 0 of the noisy signal. The third set
of moments is the "market share" of a school channel in a specific slot. Specifically,
I use a unique feature of the reporting rule that for the last sub-list, possible choices
cover all possible levels of prices and teaching quality. More conveniently, most slots
of this last sub-list are not full. The very first slot within this sub-list can be thus
regarded as a less constrained "first choice" within this sub-list, i.e., the perceived
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probability plays a less important role here. I define the "market share of j" as the
percentage of students that report j on the very first slot of this sub-list. This will
be useful to identify the mean utility term β0 of a school channel j.
2.2.6 Demand estimation
Estimation of perceived assignment probability conditional on σe
I can further simplify the expression in equation (2) above by using the fact that a
student’s score does not depend on how she reports her preferences. Define
φnij(ai, (R−i, a−i)) :=
∫




0 for k /∈ Ri
φnik(ai, (R−i, a−i))− φnik−1(ai, (R−i, a−i)) for k ∈ Ri
The benefit of such notation is that φ no longer depends on a student’s report Ri but








To estimate perceived assignment probabilities, I actually only need to estimate
ln,σai . Since I assume students have rational expectations, the expectation over σ and
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signals a in the expression of lai will be the expectation over true reports and the true
distribution of ability. Following the idea of Agarwal and Somaini (2018), I resample
from the whole observation set of students true reports to estimate the expectation.










where B is the size of resampling and b denotes each draw. To find cutoff cb cor-
responding to a sample b, we only need to apply the admission mechanism to all
individuals in this sample and assign them to school-channels, as it happens in re-
ality. Further, since the number of students are large enough, cb should not vary a
lot in different samples, and I can use the true cutoff c. Thus, I have dealt with the
randomness stemming from the distribution of students’ reports R, the distribution
of their scores c, and the white noises of students other than i. The probability should
be simply estimated as follows now:
ln,σai = P(si > c|ai)
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Using the definition of ai, I can estimate ln,σai by














The first equality holds from the definition of a. In the second equality, I use the
sampling procedure again to estimate the integrals, where B1 is a random draw from
s > c; and B2 is a random draw from all s.
After estimating ln,σai , we can use this to derive the estimation for students’ per-
ceived assignment probability LRi,ai for each report Ri.
Estimation of utility parameters and σe
To get the predicted moments, I simulate signal ai given σe, and then calculate the
perceived assignment probabilities conditional on ai as explained above. Then I draw
income and εij to calculate utilities. I then find the optimal report for each student
using the algorithm explained in section 2.2.4. Finally, I calculate the predicted
moments.
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2.3 Model of Quality Choice by Schools
2.3.1 School model and school behavior
I focus on the supply side in this subsection. I model high schools as choosing their
teaching quality only and taking prices and the number of available seats for each
channel as given by the government. High schools in the market can actually choose
their quality, price levels and quantity levels. The latter two, however, are highly
regulated by the government. In practice, most schools from the same tier choose
similar if not the same price for the same channel. Although prices among different
tiers are significantly different, price variation within tiers is small and changes only a
little over time. This suggests that schools actually only choose from a specific set of
possible prices, which is given by the government. The same pattern happens for the
number of seats for each school-channel. Thus, I assume that prices and the number
of available seats for each channel are given by the government and are not chosen by
schools in the model. This allows me to focus on the most important characteristics
of a school, its teaching quality.
Schools’ objective and first order conditions
I assume that schools care about both their profits and their teaching quality. Unlike
traditional firms, public high schools need to focus not only on their profitability,
which represents how well the schools are operated, but also on their teaching quality,
which is what schools are for and which is used for evaluation of schools by the
government. This is further supported by what I observe from the data. The data
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shows that there are always some very top schools whose most priced channels are over
demanded. This means that schools are keeping a high level of quality even though
they could increase their profit by lowering the quality without losing students paying
the high price. Another way to understand teaching quality as part of the objective,
is to interpret it as a proxy for schools’ reputation. Schools would like to keep a good
reputation over time and thus incorporate it into their objective functions.




[pjc −mc(qj)]Qjc(p, q) + (1− γ)qj
s.t.Qjc(p, q) ≤ Q̄jc (2.3)
where school j has admission channel cs and choose a quality qj to maximize its
objective function, which is a weighted average between its profit and teaching quality,
with γ as the weight. Notice that from now on, I use j only to represent school, instead
of school-channel as above, and a jc combination represents a school-channel. Schools
take price of each channel pjc and the number of available seats for each channel Q̄jc
as given. Schools will incur a marginal cost of mc(qj) to produce teaching quality of
level qj and I will specify the marginal cost function mc(·) in more details later. The
number of students admitted in each channel is Qjc, which depends on the prices and
quality of all schools.
Schools compete with each other by setting and committing to its quality before
students file their reports of preferences. The trade-off for schools in choosing the
optimal quality is the typical trade-off between demand and unit profit: an increase
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quality will lead to more demand for the school, but will reduce the unit profit it can
get. In addition, schools’ preference for quality in the objective function also add a
third factor into the trade-off.
Before I characterize their equilibrium strategies using each school’s first order
conditions, I can further simplify their objective functions. Data shows that schools
usually have at most one channel whose capacity is not binding. Thus, I can further
assume each school’s choice of quality only affects the number of students admitted via
one specific channel. Specifically, for bottom-tier schools, their free channel capacities
are not binding, and no one pays to be admitted by the low price channels. Thus, I
model them as solving
maxqjγ[pF −mc(qj)]QjF (p, q) + (1− γ)qj
Similarly, for middle-tier schools, free and low tuition channel capacities are usually
binding, and their high tuition channel capacities are usually not binding. Thus, I
model them as solving
maxqjγ{[pF −mc(qj)]Q̄jF + [pjL −mc(qj)]Q̄jL
+ [pjH −mc(qj)]QjH(p, q)}+ (1− γ)qj
It’s slightly different for the top-tier schools. Some top-tier schools are like middle-tier
schools: their free and low tuition channel capacities are usually binding, but their
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high tuition channel capacities are usually not binding.
maxqjγ{[pF −mc(qj)]Q̄jF + [pjL −mc(qj)]Q̄jL
+ [pjH −mc(qj)]QjH(p, q)}+ (1− γ)qj
However, for some very top schools within the top tier, even their high price channel
capacities are binding. I model them as solving
maxqjγ{[pF −mc(qj)]Q̄jF + [pjL −mc(qj)]Q̄jL
+ [pjH −mc(qj)]Q̄jH}+ (1− γ)qj
As a result, the first order conditions of schools from each tier can be written as
follows. For bottom-tier schools:
γ{−∂mc(qj)
∂qj
QjF (p, q) + (pF −mc(qj))
∂QjF (p, q)
∂qj
}+ (1− γ) = 0








+(1− γ) = 0
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And for top-tier schools with binding high tuition channel capacity:
γ{−∂mc(qj)
∂qj
[Q̄jF + Q̄jL + Q̄jH ]}+ (1− γ) = 0
Schools’ marginal cost of producing quality
Motivated by observations and settings above, I assume the following to characterize
the marginal cost functions of producing quality for each school:
mc(qj(k)t) = (α
0












k + ξj + ε
s
j(k)t
School j from tier k will choose quality qj(k)t at time t, and the marginal cost of
producing it is quadratic in qj(k)t with the quadratic coefficient α1k and linear coefficient
α0k + ξj + ε
s
j(k)t. ξj is an unobserved heterogeneity in marginal costs across different
schools, which is essential in explaining why different schools within the same tier
choose different quality. I set ξ of the highest quality schools within each tier to be




Plugging the marginal cost functions into the first order conditions of schools of
different tiers will give us several equations. From each equation I can write the error
term εsj(k)t as a function of parameters and variables whose values can be calculated
from the demand side. I use the assumption that E(εsj(k)t) = 0 to form moment
conditions to estimate α0k, α1k, and γ. Notice that there are two groups of different
schools within the top tier. The split in the top-tier schools gives an additional
equation which can be used to identify γ.
2.3.2 Optimal quality and its decomposition
In this subsection, I find optimal quality from schools first order conditions and
further decompose it so as to analyze what are the sources that drive changes in
quality. Without loss of generality, I take as an example the optimization problem of
the top-tier schools with non-binding capacity for their high tuition channels. From
such schools’ first order condition, plug in the specification of marginal cost, rearrange
and I have
q∗j(k)t =
pjH − α1T q∗2j(k)t















j(k)t[Q̄jF + Q̄jL +QjH(p, q
∗
j(k)t)]



















where q∗j(k)t denote the optimal quality.
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There are four terms on the right hand side of the expression for q∗j(k)t. The first
term is an analog of the usual competitive market induced quality, where we set profit
to zero. The term is always positive, and it represents the part of quality brought
by investing all tuition p to produce quality. This is the first and main source of
quality. The second term is the usual quality markdown due to market power of






on the denominator is the derivative of demand with
respect to quality. The third term is also a quality markdown due to market power
of school j, but this is due to the fact that marginal cost function mc(q) is quadratic,
instead of linear, in q. Such additional cost gives schools additional incentives to
reduce the quality level in equilibrium, to which extent the schools can markdown
the quality depends on the derivative of demand with respect to q. The second and
third term together is the total quality markdown due to the market power possessed
by the school. The last term is a preference markup. It comes from schools preference
(taste) for quality in their objective function. Again, this preference is weighted by






) and the linear coefficient of the marginal cost
function. It means that the steeper the marginal cost of producing quality, the less the
preference 1−γ
γ
is considered. Similarly, the more elastic the demand is with respect
to quality, the less the preference is considered.
In summary, the optimal quality found through the FOC can be correspondingly
decomposed into three sources: the competitive level (first term) which school would
choose if it makes 0 profit, and it also maximizes demand; the quality markdown
(second and third term), similar to the price markup in a traditional industry where
firms choose price, but in an opposite direction. Such markdown comes from the
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market power schools have and schools can thus keep a positive unit profit by marking
down quality and thus cost. The third one is the preference markup (forth term) since
schools care about quality
2.4 Results
Estimation results for important demand parameters are presented in Table 2.1





price× a 0.0225∗∗ (0.0149)
quality × a 0.0297∗∗∗ (0.0105)
distance× a 0.0582∗∗∗ (0.0290)
price× gender −0.0035∗∗ (0.0019)
quality × gender 0.0021 (0.0027)
distance× gender 0.0014 (0.0012)
σe 0.1095
∗∗ (0.0631)
unit: price(10,000 rmb), distance (10km); for sim-
plicity of presenting results, the coefficient on price
in the table is the negative of the coefficient on
log(income− price)
First, students’ utility will increase with teaching quality but will decrease with
price and distance, all of which are as expected. This means that students prefer high
quality but dislike price and distance. The coefficient of price × a means that when
students’ signal of their exam scores increases by one unit, which is one standard
deviation of the normalized exam scores, the taste for price will increase by 0.0225.
Notice that the mean taste for price is negative, −0.0311, then this means that stu-
dents with higher signal will have less negative tastes for price than those with lower
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signals. Students with higher signals care less about price and are less sensitive to it,
as expected. Similar results hold for distance. The coefficient of distance× a means
that when students’ signal of their scores increases by one unit, the taste for distance
will increase by 0.0582. Notice that the mean taste for distance is negative, −0.0214,
this means that students with higher signals will have less negative tastes for distance
than those with lower signals. Students with higher signals care less about distance
and are less sensitive to it, as expected. The implication for teaching quality, however,
is different. Although the coefficient of quqality×a is also positive, meaning that the
taste for price will increase by 0.0297 when students’ signal of their scores increases
by one unit, the mean taste for quality is positive, 0.2830. This means that students
with higher signals will have more positive tastes for quality than those with lower
signals. Students with higher signals care more about quality and are more sensitive
to it.
The estimation results for supply parameters are presented in Table 2.2.












0.686 0.197 0.011 0.240 2.445 0.346 10.523
(0.231) (0.104) (0.008) (0.132) (0.859) (0.227) (2.815)
unit: Q(1,000 students)
The results show that the marginal cost of producing quality are lowest for top-tier
schools, with the small numbers on αT s, and highest for bottom-tier schools with the
large numbers on αBs. For top-tier schools, the linear term α0T in marginal cost plays
a more significant role than the quadratic term α1T . For middle-tier and bottom-tier
schools, however, the quadratic terms α1M and α1B are more important than the linear
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terms α0M and α0B. Also, the difference in the quadratic terms α1s among different
tiers are larger than the difference in the linear terms α0s. This means that the main
difference in marginal cost among different tiers comes from different quadratic terms.
Due to such differences in marginal cost of producing quality, top-tier schools would
be able to produce teaching quality more efficiently at lower costs and will in turn
choose higher quality.
2.5 Counterfactual Analysis
2.5.1 Distributional effects of the policy and possible remedy
The main benefit of the current policy of paid admission options is the gain in teaching
quality. However, such quality gain is not equally distributed across students for two
reasons as explained above. Namely, better schools benefit more from this policy and
are able to increase their teaching quality more than other schools do, creating an
inequality among schools. Also, this policy gives richer students more choices while
leaving poorer students no more access to good schools than before. In order to
address such restricted access to higher teaching quality, I propose a modification to
the current policy that introduces subsidies to low income students.
Specifically, since I only observe a distribution of income instead of individual
level income, I need to simulate the admission results under current policy with an
assumed relationship between income distribution and students’ exam scores. For
simplicity, I assume income is independent of students’ exam scores and then draw
48
an income for each individual. Then, I use the estimated demand and supply models
to find the new equilibrium quality chosen by schools. This allows me to simulate
students’ reports and the admission results, from which I can calculate the percentage
of students admitted to different tiers of schools from each income group.
Second, I use the same draw of income to find the new equilibrium teaching quality
and simulate students reports and admission results under the modified policy. From
the simulated admission results, I can calculate a new percentage of students admitted
to different tiers of schools from each income group. Comparing these results will
show us how access to good schools are affected by the modified policy. The modified
policies give tuition subsidies up to a certain amount to low income students if they
are admitted through a priced admission option. The simulation results are presented
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Percentage of students from each income group who are admitted to
top-tier schools under different levels of subsidies
Current Policy 8000 24000 50000
90%− 100% 0.92 0.90 0.77 0.64
70%− 90% 0.80 0.80 0.72 0.62
50%− 70% 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.60
30%− 50% 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60
10%− 30% 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.58
0%− 10% 0.20 0.23 0.43 0.57
The first column represents the current policy of priced admission options. For
students from the top-10%-income families, 92% of them are admitted to top-tier
schools, through either free, low or high tuition options. When family income de-
creases (going down the column), the percentage of students from the corresponding
income group who are admitted to top-tier schools decreases quickly. For the bottom-
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10%-income families, only 20% of them attend top-tier schools. This is consist with
the fact that approximately 20% of total seats of the market are provided by top-
tier school free-channels. Remember from the graph above that about 60-65% of
total seats of the market are provided by top-tier schools. This means that under
the current policy, rich students are over represented while poor students are under
represented.
In the second column, I introduce a subsidy up to RMB 8000 to poor students,
who I define to students from the poorer half of the population. The results show
that only a few more students from bottom-30%-income families go to top-tier schools.
The small effect can be explained by the fact that RMB 8000 is less than half of the
low price of top-tier schools, and thus makes little difference. But it does increase the
percentage of such students who attend middle-tier schools more significantly.
The third column represents a subsidy up to RMB 24000 for poor students. We
can see that the percentage of students from bottom-30%-income families that go to
top-tier schools increases more. Actually, 24000 is enough for all low price channels of
top-tier schools, and thus the increase mostly comes from the increase of admissions
through low price channels for poor students. Since 24000 is only half of the prevailing
RMB 50000 for high price admission channels, such subsidy has little effect on who
are admitted through high price channels. The changes for students from top-income
families are mostly driven by decreases in their admission through the low tuition
channels.
Finally, in the last column, I introduce a subsidy of up to RMB 50000, which
covers all high price channels of top-tier schools. The results show that many more
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students from low income families go to top-tier schools, while far fewer students from
rich families attend top-tier schools. In fact, the percentage of students who go to
top-tier schools are roughly the same for each income group. This is not surprising
since now income is rarely a constraint and I assume income is independent of exam
scores. Actually, the distribution of students across different tier of schools under this
policy is similar to that under no policy at all, since tuition is no longer a constraint.
More importantly, if the government taxes all of the tuition richer students pay for
the high-price channels to finance its subsidies to poorer students, the government can
actually break-even, since I define low income as students from the poorer half of the
population. Meanwhile, there is still gain in the teaching quality since the subsidies
are collected by the schools as tuition eventually. In short, introducing subsidies to
low income students on top of current policy of priced admission options will give
students more equal access to good schools while keeping the quality gain.
2.5.2 Understanding the sources of quality change brought by
prices
Results above show that introducing prices to public schools leads to increase in
teaching quality. However, such results are not rigorous, and the increase in teaching
quality may come not only from introducing prices, but also from introducing new
capacities for new channels. In this subsection, I separate these two forces by com-
paring the current policy with a counterfactual, where the capacities for each channel
are kept fixed, and the price of the high tuition channel of each school is reduced to
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the price of the low tuition channel of that school. I further decompose the optimal
quality in these two scenarios to understand the sources of change of quality. As in
section 2.3.2, without loss of generality, I use as an example the optimization prob-
lem of the top-tier schools with non-binding capacity for their high tuition channels.
Table 2.4 below shows the decomposition of quality under current policy on the first
row and the decomposition of quality under the counterfactual in the second row.
For simplicity of explanation, the change (∆) in the third row is the change from the
counterfactual (second row) to current policy (first row).
Table 2.4: Decomposition of quality under current policy and reduced price
for high tuition channels
q competitive markdown markdown preference
level (linear) (quadratic) markup
Current policy 0.950 2.232 −1.705 −0.018 0.441
pjH set to pjL 0.801 1.189 −0.517 −0.005 0.134
∆ 0.149 1.042 −1.187 −0.013 0.307
% 100 701 −798 −9 206
the change (∆) in the third row is the change from the counterfactual (second row) to
current policy (first row).
When the price of the high tuition channel is increased from a hypothetical reduced
price to the current level, the increase in quality is 0.149 standard deviation (s.d.)
of the test scores. Out of this change, changes from competitive level of quality and
linear markdown are the main drivers, at similar magnitude but in different directions.
The competitive level of quality brings an increase in quality of 1.042 s.d.. This is
mainly driven by the huge increase in price. A linear markdown brings a decrease in
quality of 1.187 s.d. The change in linear markdown, however, is mainly driven by
the change in the demand derivative with respect to quality. A unit change in quality
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will bring a smaller demand when the price (tuition) is higher, making the demand
derivative with respect to quality to be decreasing in price. As a result, when the
price goes up, the demand derivative with respect to quality decreases, giving schools
more market power. This means that schools can markdown quality more when the
price is higher. The quadratic markdown and its change are in a smaller scale when
compared to the linear markdown. It brings a decrease in quality of 0.013 s.d. Finally,
the preference markup brings an increase in quality of 0.307 s.d., and brings the total
change of quality to an increase.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the impact of allowing public high schools to offer both free
and priced admission options.
On the demand side, I estimate an empirical model of school choice by students. I
collect data of students’ reports of school preferences. Students are allowed to rank a
limited number of schools of their choice in a report that they must file before taking
the entrance exam. They are then admitted through a variation of serial dictator-
ship mechanism. Thus, students need to be strategic, and consider not only their
true preferences, but also their beliefs about admission probabilities based on a noisy
signal of their test scores. I use such reported preferences to estimate students’ true
school preferences and beliefs about admission probabilities. The spread of the char-
acteristics between the first and last reported schools is useful to identify the variance
of the noisy signal. The interaction between student and school characteristics helps
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to identify important utility parameters. I estimate the parameters using simulated
moments, together with an algorithm I propose to find optimal reports for individual
students. Results show that students prefer quality and dislike price. More impor-
tantly, students with higher scores, when compared to students with lower scores,
care more about quality and less about price.
On the supply side, I model schools to care about a weighted average between
profit and its quality, so as to incorporate the facts that schools may want to keep
excess demand in the market. To better understand schools’ choice of quality, I
explicitly model schools’ marginal costs of producing quality as being quadratic in
quality. I combine such models of school competition with the demand side to estimate
the model. Results show that better schools have lower marginal cost of producing
quality and will choose a higher level of teaching quality.
The counterfactual analysis shows that introducing subsidies to low income stu-
dents while keeping the current priced admission options would give students more
equal access to better schools, while keeping the quality gain brought by market
incentives. Another counterfactual analysis shows that the quality gain brought by









In this article, we study participation in a second-price auction with independent pri-
vate values and public participation costs. Our framework expands existing models
by accommodating rich forms of bidder heterogeneity, which enables a wide range
of empirical applications facilitating policy analysis of auction markets. Our main
contributions are a general characterization of the game’s equilibria and identifica-
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tion of sufficient conditions that guarantee both equilibrium uniqueness and efficient
outcomes.
We develop a notion of relative competitiveness called strength to characterize
the auction’s set of equilibria. Using the publicly known characteristics of bidders,
strength ranks potential bidders by their ability to endure competition. The strength
of a bidder is computed by the unique symmetric strategy profile in which the bidder
is best-responding; that is, strength is the hypothetical participation-cutoff value
that would make a bidder indifferent to participate, conditional on all other bidders
using the same strategy as the bidder. Although this strategy is generally not an
equilibrium, it neatly captures a bidder’s ability to endure competition. Relative to
another bidder’s strength, a lower strength value—i.e., a stronger bidder—indicates
that the bidder is willing to participate in the auction at a lower valuation even while
facing competitors who are also participating at lower valuations; i.e., the bidder is
more willing to participate despite facing more competition.
We define a herculean equilibrium as an equilibrium in which stronger bidders
are more willing to participate—i.e., the bidders’ participation strategies are ordered
by their relative strength. We show that, in general environments, a herculean equi-
librium always exists. Despite the ex-post inefficiencies that are created by costly
participation, we also show that an ex-ante efficient equilibrium exists. In addi-
tion, we show that when the distributions of valuations are concave, the game has a
unique equilibrium. We also provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness when the
distributions of valuations are not concave. Therefore, when any of these sufficiency
conditions hold, the unique equilibrium is both herculean and efficient.
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A bidder’s strength can be computed in any game, allowing to rank every potential
auction participant. Strength allows to generalize existing work on quasi-symmetric
games to environments without restrictions on the distributions of valuations or on
participation costs. Quasi-symmetric games are those in which: (i) bidders have
identical participation costs and their valuations are ordered by first-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD; Tan and Yilankaya, 2006); or (ii) bidders with symmetric dis-
tributions of valuations, ordered by their participation costs (Cao and Tian, 2013).
Strength is specially suited for applied research, as it allows us to rank bidders, and
consequently, characterize equilibria in games with any degree of bidder heterogeneity.
To illustrate the previous point, consider the US Forest Service timber auctions
studied in Roberts and Sweeting (2013). They assume a quasi-symmetric environment
in which large bidders’ (mills) valuations FOSD those of small bidders (loggers) but
have identical participation costs. Suppose that, after the model has been estimated,
we want to evaluate a policy that recommends subsidizing the participation cost of
loggers.1 This counterfactual scenario is no longer quasi-symmetric, as the millers’
advantage in drawing higher valuations might be offset by the loggers’ lower cost of
participating. Whether millers are still stronger than loggers depends on the size of
the subsidy. Since bidders are not quasi-symmetric, existing models cannot predict
which firms are more likely to participate, whether the game has a unique equilibrium
and, consequently, whether counterfactual analyses are robust to the existence of other
equilibria. This article characterizes which firms are more likely to participate in the
1. As example of this type of policy, Marion (2007) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) evaluate
entry fees and subsidies in the context of first price auctions.
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new scenario and provides a sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness that can
be easily checked.
This article contributes to the literature of auctions with participation costs. In
this literature, there are two broad classes of models that describe bidders’ own infor-
mation about their valuations. Levin and Smith (1994) study auction participation in
environments where participation decisions are made with no private information (see
also Jehiel and Lamy, 2015; McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Tan, 1992). In this frame-
work, participation becomes a coordination game, and generally leads to multiple
equilibria. When signals are informative but public—i.e., observed by all bidders—
environments also resemble coordination games, as in Levin and Smith (1994). By
contrast, our framework builds upon Samuelson (1985), who studied a symmetric en-
vironment in which bidders learn their private information prior to the participation
decision. Within this framework, Campbell (1998) studies coordinated entry, whereas
Tan and Yilankaya (2007) examine collusive outcomes and Menezes and Monteiro
(2000) study optimal auction design. Recent articles have allowed more general in-
formation structures in which bidders receive (private) signals about their valuations
before participating in the auction (c.f. Gentry and Li, 2014; Roberts and Sweeting,
2016; Sweeting and Bhattacharya, 2015). We discuss such models in Section 3.6.
Tan and Yilankaya (2006) and Cao and Tian (2013) identify conditions for a
unique equilibrium in the context of quasi-symmetric games. The restricted degree
of bidder-heterogeneity in their frameworks, however, constrains bidders’ behavior
in meaningful ways, making quasi-symmetric environments inadequate for applied
work. We show that, in quasi-symmetric games where bidders play an herculean
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equilibrium, bidders have the same ranking in their probability of participating, equi-
librium cutoffs, and expected revenues. Hence, when a unique equilibrium exists,
quasi-symmetric environments cannot accommodate a bidder who is more likely to
participate, but receives lower expected profits on average than a competitor. In line
with Maskin and Riley (2000), we show that high-participation low-profit behavior
can emerge in models with richer degrees of bidder heterogeneity. This article, there-
fore, provides a theoretical framework that better meets applied researchers’ needs to
accommodate behavior observed in data.
Our welfare analysis expands the early work of Stegeman (1996) (see also Lu,
2009). Although every equilibrium is ex-post inefficient, Stegeman (1996) shows that
SPA with participation costs have one equilibrium that is ex-ante efficient. We provide
a direct proof of Stegeman’s result. Furthermore, we show that each equilibrium
corresponds to a (possibly local) maximum or a saddle point of the social welfare
function. Finally, by identifying the equilibrium that survives when the uniqueness
condition holds, we partially characterize the efficient equilibria.
Finally, Espín-Sánchez and Parra (2019) generalizes the ideas of strength and
herculean equilibrium developed here to characterize entry into oligopolistic markets.
Despite the similarities in goals, there are key differences in terms of methodologies
and results that make the contributions of this article distinctive. This article crucially
relies on the linear-payoff structure of second-price auctions. In particular, welfare
results, the sharper sufficient conditions for uniqueness, and more importantly the
induction argument used in the characterization of the n-bidder scenario do not extend
to their environment. In contrast, the techniques in Espín-Sánchez and Parra (2019)
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rely on a post-entry strict payoff-monotonicity assumption that is not satisfied in
second-price auctions.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model.
Section 3.3 characterizes all equilibria, establishes existence and discusses efficiency.
Section 3.4 defines strength, herculean equilibria and presents the main results of the
article. Section 3.5 discusses the importance of allowing models with more hetero-
geneity than quasi-symmetry. Section 3.6 extends the results to environments with a
reserve price and environments with partially informed bidders. Section 3.7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 Setup
Consider a sealed-bid second-price auction with no reservation price in an independent
private values environment.2 The auction consists of one seller, n potential bidders,
and one indivisible good. Before making any participation decision, each bidder i
observes her valuation for the object vi which is drawn from an atomless distribu-
tion function Fi with full support on R+. We assume that each Fi is continuously
differentiable and has a finite expectation.3 Upon privately observing their own valu-
ation, each bidder, independently and simultaneously, decides whether to participate
in the auction. If bidder i decides to participate, she incurs a cost ci > 0. The tuple
(Fi, ci)ni=1, which includes the number of potential bidders n, is commonly known by
2. For results in a common value setting see Murto and Välimäki (2015).
3. Our results would still hold if the support of Fi were the interval [0, bi] with bi > 0. This,
however, would complicate our exposition as we would have to consider corner solutions.
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all the bidders.
Definition (Symmetric and quasi-symmetric games). A game is called symmetric if
Fi = F and ci = c for all i. A game is called quasi-symmetric if either: (i) Fi = F
for all i, or (ii) ci = c for all i and Fi are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD).
After bidders make participation decisions, they observe other participating agents’
identities. Afterwards, every participant submits their bid simultaneously. We sim-
plify the bidding stage by assuming that each player bids their valuation; i.e., bidders
play their weakly dominant strategy.4 Therefore, we restrict attention to participa-
tion strategies. A participation strategy for bidder i is a mapping from bidder i’s
valuation to a probability of participating in the auction τi : R+ → [0, 1]. We assume
that bidder i’s strategy is an integrable function with respect to her own type vi. We
study the Bayesian Equilibrium of the participation game.
Given a strategy profile τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), define




to be the ex-ante probability that bidder i does not obtain the object when the
highest bid among her opponents is v. Observe that Ti(v) > 0 whenever v > 0. The
expected utility of a bidder who participates in the auction with probability τi(v),
4. Tan and Yilankaya (2006) model non-participation as submission of a zero bid. Technically,
their model is a one-stage game in which a bidder’s dominant strategy is not to bid their valuation.
By contrast, we explicitly model the sequential bid process. Both formulations are equivalent.
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faces opponents playing τ−i, and values the good by v is:










k 6=i Tk(v) is the probability that bidder i obtains the object when
her valuation is v. In other words, conditional on participating, the expected utility
of bidder i is the expected value of getting the good vGi(v), minus the participation
costs ci, minus the expected price paid, which distributes according to dGi(v) and is
equal to the second highest bid in the auction.
3.3 Preliminary Results
In this section, we provide a preliminary characterization of the equilibria and effi-
ciency properties of the game. We establish the existence of an equilibrium and we
show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to cutoff strate-
gies. In addition, we prove that, although every equilibrium of the game is ex-post
inefficient, an ex-ante efficient equilibrium always exists.
3.3.1 Equilibrium existence




1 if v ≥ x
0 if v < x
.
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A cutoff strategy specifies whether a bidder participates in the auction with cer-
tainty depending on her valuation being above some given threshold. Lemma 1 below
shows that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to cutoff strategies.
Lemma 1 (Cutoff are best responses). For each profile of opponent’s strategies τ−i,
bidder i has a unique best response. Bidder i’s best response is a cutoff strategy given
by the unique value of v that solves ui(τi = 1, τ−i, v) = 0.
Lemma 1 follows from showing that, conditional on participation, and regardless
of their opponents’ strategies, a bidder’s (expected) utility is monotonically increasing
with respect to their own valuation, vi. Then, because a bidders’ utility is linear in the
participation probability, and since they want to participate whenever there is positive
expected utility to do so, bidders best respond by playing a cutoff strategy. The cutoff
is defined by the valuation that gives zero expected utility for participating in the
auction. When a bidder’s valuation is equal to its cutoff, the bidder is indifferent to
whether or not to participate in the auction. We break this indifference by assuming
that bidders participate. The main consequence of Lemma 1 is that each equilibrium,
if any exists, must be in cutoff strategies.
From now on, we abuse notation by denoting a cutoff strategy in terms of the cutoff
itself. In addition, and without loss of generality, we order the bidders’ identities
according to their equilibrium cutoffs, with x1 being the bidder with the lowest cutoff
and xn the bidder with the highest. For a given vector of cutoff strategies x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) define xi = (x1, x2, . . . , xi) to be the vector of cutoffs up to bidder
i. Let Ani =
∏n
j>i Fj(xj) be the probability that bidders playing cutoffs above xi do
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not participate in the auction; let Bi(v) =
∏
j<i Fj(v) be the probability that bidders












be bidder i’s expected revenue when bidder i plays the highest participation cutoff in
a game with n = i potential bidders and bidder i’s valuation is equal to its cutoff.5
The next lemma characterizes every equilibria in the participation game.
Lemma 2 (Cutoff Equilibrium). The vector x of cutoff strategies constitutes an equi-
librium if and only if the following condition holds for each bidder i:
Ani ri(x
i) = ci (3.3)
To understand equation ((3.3)) recall that, in equilibrium, if a bidder’s valuation
is equal to its cutoff, they must be indifferent to participating in the auction. For
any bidder i, if vi = xi, participation by any bidder with a higher cutoff would imply
losing the object. This event occurs with probability 1−Ani and leaves bidder i with
zero revenue. As a consequence, bidder i only makes revenue with probability Ani .
In this scenario, bidder i is the participating bidder with the highest participation
cutoff and receives revenue ri(xi). The expected revenue of bidder i is the expected
revenue conditional on winning times the probability of winning. In equilibrium,
when a bidder’s valuation is equal to its participation cutoff, the expected revenue




∅ = 1, and x0 = 0.
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from participating is equal to the participation cost. This indifference condition must
hold for each bidder.
Lemma 2 characterizes all equilibria of the game but does not provide any informa-
tion about whether equilibria exist or about which bidder plays which cutoff. Section
3.4 links bidders’ public characteristics to equilibrium cutoffs. The next proposition,
which follows from Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, establishes equilibrium existence.
Proposition 1 (Existence). For any game (Fi, ci)ni=1 there exists an equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Because a bidder’s valuation is un-
bounded above, and because the opponents’ valuations have finite expected value, it
is possible to find a cutoff for each bidder such that expected payoffs from partici-
pating in the auction are positive regardless of the opponents’ behavior. With this
upper bound, it is possible to compactify the set of feasible strategies. Due to the
continuity of the best response functions, the existence result follows from Brouwer’s
Fixed-point theorem.
3.3.2 Welfare analysis
We now discuss efficiency. As Stegeman (1996) pointed out, when participation is
costly, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency are not equivalent. Moreover, when participation
is costly, the revelation principle no longer applies because, in the equivalent direct
mechanism, each bidder incurs a cost ci to send a message—i.e., submit a bid—
(Myerson, 1981). Thus, as there is no “cost free” way to elicit bidders’ preferences.
When more messages are solicited, any optimal mechanism trades off the direct cost
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of ex-ante soliciting more messages with the potential benefits from a better ex-post
allocation. Although such a mechanism may be ex-ante optimal, any mechanism that
does not solicit messages from all bidders in general produces ex-post misallocation
with positive probability.
To illustrate this point, consider Figure 3.1, which depicts an equilibrium with
two potential bidders, each with equal participation costs (ci = c), but different cutoff
equilibrium strategies (x1 < x2). Note that for an allocation to be ex-post efficient,
only the bidder with the highest valuation, which must be above the participation
cost, should participate in the auction.
In general, three types of inefficiencies arise. (i) Insufficient Participation (dark-
shaded area): represents realizations of (v1, v2) in which there is at least one bidder
whose valuation is greater than participation costs, but bidders stay out of the auction.
(ii) Excessive Participation (lightly-shaded area): represents situations in which both
bidders enter the auction, paying excessive participation costs. (iii) Misallocation
(dotted area): realizations in which exactly one bidder participates, but is the bidder
with the lowest valuation for the good. It is worth noticing that, conditional on
participation, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction independent of
the number of participants. Therefore, inefficiencies only arise due to miscoordinated
participation.
From an ex-ante perspective, however, there is an efficient equilibrium. Consider
the problem that a planner faces when choosing a strategy for each bidder conditional
on the bidder’s private information; i.e., the planner chooses a set of functions τ ∗i : R+








Figure 3.1: Ex-post inefficiency.
Using similar arguments to those in Lemma 1 it can be shown that the planner
only considers cutoff functions.6 Therefore, the planner chooses the vector of cutoffs






(viΩi(vi, x−i)− ci) dFi(vi)
]
(3.4)
where Ωi(vi, x−i) =
∏
k 6=i Fk(max{vi, xk}) is the probability that bidder i obtains the
object when her valuation is vi. Notice that transfers between the winning bidder
and the seller are irrelevant in terms of welfare. To explain (3.4) further, we focus
on the planner’s payoffs from bidder i. With probability dFi(vi), bidder i draws the
valuation vi and participates in the auction whenever vi ≥ xi, in which case she
pays the participation cost ci and wins the object with probability Ωi(vi, x−i). Total
6. Notice that in this case, the planner only solicits messages (bids) from bidders whose valuations
are above the specified cutoff. That is, the planner does not solicit messages from all bidders with
certainty.
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welfare is simply the aggregation of all possible values for a given bidder (integral),
aggregated across all bidders (summation).
Proposition 2 (Welfare). There exists an equilibrium that is ex-ante efficient. Every
critical point of the welfare function corresponds to an equilibrium of the game. That
is, each equilibrium is either a (possibly local) maximum, or saddle point of W (x).
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows: consider the social contribution
of a marginal decrease in bidder i’s participation cutoff, xi. By decreasing their
cutoff, bidder i participates on a larger range of values, paying the participation cost
ci more often and, with probability Ωi, becoming the highest valuation bidder. This
latter effect also decreases the opponents’ probability of obtaining the good, Ωj. This
decrease in probability occurs when an opponent who was winning the good is outbid
by i. In these cases, bidder i’s social contribution is the gap between bidder i’s
valuation and the second highest valuation. In a second-price auction, when the price
paid is the valuation of the second-highest bidder, this gap is the same as bidder’s
i private gain. That is, the social trade-offs faced by the planner match the private
trade-offs faced by a bidder. Because in an inflection point, the social (private) gain
nets out from the entry cost ci, every equilibrium matches an inflection point of the
social welfare function. Notice, however, this equivalence may be broken if there is a
reservation (minimum) bid.
This efficiency result is similar in spirit to Levin and Smith (1994), which shows
that every participation equilibrium is ex-ante efficient when bidders are symmetric
and have no private information at the moment of participation. Their findings do
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not extend directly when private information exists. Privately informed bidders self-
select according to their own characteristics, information, and expectations of other
bidders’ behavior. Different expectations may lead bidders to coordinate in inefficient
equilibria, even if bidders are ex-ante symmetric.
To further illustrate the relation between uniqueness and efficiency, and to moti-
vate the analysis that follows, we consider the case of n = 2 potential bidders. The





Observe that, under concavity of Fi, the second order condition for a maximum is
satisfied at every critical point.7 Therefore, only one critical point exists and the
game has a unique, efficient equilibrium. This finding suggests that some form of
concavity of the CDF may be sufficient to guarantee both uniqueness and efficient
outcomes. As we show below, this intuition extends to a large set of models that are
relevant for applied analysis.
7. Concavity of the CDF implies Fi(x) ≥ xfi(x) for every x > 0. Then, at every equilibrium







3.4 Strength and Herculean Equilibrium
In this section, we present the main results of the article. In particular, we connect
the bidders’ public characteristics (Fi, ci)ni=1 to the game’s equilibrium strategies. The
definition below, which only uses the information given in the game fundamentals,
ranks bidders in terms of their ability to endure competition. We use this notion to
further describe bidders’ participation strategies.
Definition (Strength). For a given game (Fi, ci)ni=1, the strength of bidder i is the




Fk (si) = ci. (3.5)
We say that bidder i is stronger than j if si < sj.
Observe that the left hand side of (3.5) is strictly increasing in si, takes the value
of 0 when si = 0, and is unbounded above. Therefore, strength is well defined. Each
bidder i has a unique scalar si. Thus, we can always use strength to rank all bidders
in the game. Notice that the index si is inversely related to strength of a bidder. A
lower si means a stronger bidder.
Strength uses all public information from the game to elicit bidders’ ability to
endure competition. The strength of bidder i is defined as the cutoff that bidder i
plays in the unique symmetric strategy profile in which bidder i is best-responding
(see equation (3.3) for the case of symmetric cutoffs). By computing this (symmetric)
strategy in the context of asymmetric bidders, we can measure a bidder’s willingness
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to participate in the auction relative to their ability to endure competition. To see
this, start by noticing that facing a lower participation cutoff from a competitor
means that a bidder faces more competition. Because of symmetric behavior, a
lower measure of strength si means that a bidder is willing to participate at a lower
valuation, even when her competitors participate more often—i.e., a bidder is more
willing to participate despite facing more competition.
In order to further understand strength, the next lemma relates it with the notions
of bidder competitiveness developed by the previous literature.
Lemma 3 (Strength in quasi-symmetric games).
1. If bidders have the same participation costs, and if their distributions of val-
uations are ordered by FOSD, then bidders who stochastically dominate other
bidders are stronger.
2. If bidders have the same distributions of valuations but different participation
costs, then bidders who have lower participation costs are stronger.
The order provided by strength coincides with existing notions of relative competi-
tiveness among bidders, such as FOSD or participation-cost order. Strength, however,
extends the order to scenarios in which relative competitiveness is not self-evident.8
Take, for example, a bidder whose distribution of valuations first-order stochastically
dominates that of another bidder, but has a higher participation cost. This scenario
is likely to arise in practice when the auctioneer subsidizes participation costs of small
8. Tan and Yilankaya (2006) calls the order induced by FOSD intuitive, whereas Cao and Tian
(2013) calls the cost-order monotone. Because, in general, the order provided by strength might nei-
ther be intuitive nor monotone, we decided to avoid confusion and adopt the current nomenclature.
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firms. In this case, although the former bidder may be stronger, as it is likely to draw
a higher valuation, it may also be weaker than the latter bidder, who also has lower
participation costs. Strength not only ranks bidders in this (or any other) scenario but
also, as is shown below, provides meaningful information about equilibrium behavior.
Definition (Herculean Equilibrium). An equilibrium is called herculean if the equi-
librium cutoffs are ordered by strength, with stronger bidders playing lower cutoffs.
That is, xi < xj if and only if si < sj.
Because stronger bidders are more able to endure competition, they should be
more inclined than weaker bidders to participate in the auction. In terms of equilib-
rium behavior, stronger bidders should play lower participation cutoffs. As we show
in the following sections, this intuition is correct: in most applications a herculean
equilibrium will exist.
Finally, notice that in symmetric games all bidders are equally strong; thus, in
a herculean equilibrium bidders must play symmetric strategies. Furthermore, the
strength of each bidder coincides with their symmetric equilibrium cutoff; i.e., xi = si.
Therefore, in symmetric games the notions of strength, symmetric equilibrium, and
herculean equilibrium coincide. Because strength is well defined, this trivially implies
that symmetric games have a unique symmetric equilibrium (of course, symmetric
games may still have asymmetric equilibria.)
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3.4.1 Herculean equilibrium under two bidders
In order to better illustrate our results, we start by presenting them in a two potential-
bidder environment. From now on, unless otherwise noted, we order bidders’ identities
by their strength, with bidder 1 being the strongest bidder in the game. The following
proposition is our main result in this context.
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness). There always exists a herculean equi-
librium. Every herculean equilibria is characterized by cutoffs x1 ≤ x2 that jointly
solve
x1F2(x2) = c1 and x2F1(x2)−
∫ x2
x1
vdF1(v) = c2. (3.6)
Moreover, a herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game—and, there-
fore, ex-ante efficient—if the following condition holds for each bidder
Fi(v) ≥ vfi(v) for all v ≥ cj. (3.7)
Proposition 3 generalizes existing results in the literature in two ways. By in-
troducing the notion of strength, we associate bidders’ public characteristics with
equilibrium-cutoffs order in any game (Fi, ci)2i=1—that is, without limiting our atten-
tion to specific distributions of valuations and without restrictions on participation
costs. The proposition also confirms the intuition that an equilibrium in which the
strong bidder plays a lower participation cutoffs should exists. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the proposition provides a sufficient condition on the shape of the distributions
73
of valuations for the game to have a unique equilibrium. This result is particularly
important for applied work, as it provides a testable condition that guarantees ro-
bust counterfactual analysis. Furthermore, as a consequence of Proposition 2, the
sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness also guarantees efficient outcomes.9
In intuitive terms, condition (3.7) shapes the opponent’s best-response so that
payoffs are monotone in a bidder’s strategy. It guarantees that bidder i’s expected
revenue is increasing in her cutoff xi, even when bidder j best responds to the in-
crease in xi by decreasing xj (increasing competition). This implies that only one
cutoff makes bidder i indifferent to participate in the auction, leading to a unique
equilibrium. From bidder i’s perspective, bidder j’s best response is a function of i’s
distribution (see equations in (3.6)). Because condition (3.7) regulates best-response
behavior, the condition only needs to hold for valuations that are above the oppo-
nents’ entry costs, as no bidder would participate when her valuation is below her
cost. The next lemma would help us to further characterize sufficient condition (3.7).
Lemma 4. 1) If (F1, F2) are concave, then (3.7) is satisfied and the equilibrium is
unique. 2) If the distributions (F1, F2) become concave for high valuations, there exists
a pair of entry costs (c1, c2) such that the game has a unique equilibrium.10
Condition (3.7) is a weak form of concavity. In particular, auctions with concave
distributions of valuations (e.g., Exponential, Generalized Pareto, or the standard
Half-Normal distributions) always have a unique equilibrium. Many other distribu-
9. Observe, however, that the proposition does not tell us that a herculean equilibrium is always ex-
ante efficient. For instance, in symmetric games, when there are multiple equilibria, the symmetric
equilibrium need not be the efficient equilibrium.
10. The proof of the lemma shows how to find the costs that guarantee equilibrium uniqueness.
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tions, such as Beta, Gamma, or Weibull are concave for certain parameter speci-
fications. Most distributions used in applications are concave for sufficiently high
valuations. The Lemma also show that for these eventually-concave distributions
there are sufficiently high participation costs guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness.
Example 3, below, illustrates this point.
Examples. To illustrate the usefulness of strength and herculean equilibria, and to
illustrate the workings of the sufficient condition, we develop three examples. The first
two examples make use of a Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD).11 The choice of
GPD yields a simple concave distribution with positive support that is flexible enough
to change its mean and variance. Results and intuitions in the examples apply more
generally. The third example corresponds to a log-normal distribution which is S-
shaped.
1. Second-order stochastic dominance. Consider two asymmetric bidders whose
distribution of valuations follows a GPD with shape parameter κ and scale parame-
ter σ. Suppose both bidders have a symmetric participation cost c, but bidder 1 is
characterized by (κ1, σ1) = (0, 1) and bidder 2 by (κ2, σ2) = (0.25, 0.75). Both distri-
butions have the same mean but the second distribution has twice the variance. That
is, the second distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the first. Because the CDFs
cross, distributions are not ordered by FOSD. This game is not quasi-symmetric and
11. For κ ∈ R and σ ∈ (0,∞), the Generalized Pareto CDF is defined over R+ and given by





)− 1κ κ 6= 0
1− e− xσ κ = 0
.
The CDF is concave whenever κ > −1, its mean is well defined for κ < 1 and given by σ/(1 − κ),














(b) Strength under different participation costs
Figure 3.2: Strength under second-order stochastic dominance.
it is not self-evident which bidder is stronger. Consequently, existing tools in the
literature cannot characterize equilibrium behavior, nor determine whether the game
has a unique equilibrium.
Intuitively, the stronger bidder would be the one whose distribution of valuations
has more mass to the right of the equilibrium cutoffs strategies, as this implies the
bidder is more likely to obtain higher valuations. If the equilibrium cutoff strategies
are high, then bidder 2 would have more mass to the right of the cutoffs, and thus
bidder 2 would be the stronger bidder. High equilibrium cutoff strategies are likely to
occur when participation costs are high. Conversely, if the cutoff strategies are low,
then bidder 1 would have more probability mass to the right of the cutoffs, and thus
bidder 1 would be the stronger bidder. Low equilibrium cutoff strategies are likely to
occur when participation costs are low.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Panel (a) shows that both distributions are
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concave, thus Lemma 4 implies that the participation game has a unique equilibrium
for any participation costs c > 0. Panel (a) also shows that both distributions cross
at v◦ = 2.2007. Panel (b) depicts the bidders’ strength. It shows that bidders are
equally strong when c◦ = 1.957. For participation costs above c◦, bidder 2 is stronger
(s2 < s1) and, in the unique equilibrium, bidder 2 plays a lower cutoff strategy
(x2 < x1). For instance, if ca = 2 > c◦, then the vector of equilibrium cutoffs is
x = (2.241, 2.238). Alternatively, when c < c◦, bidder 1 is stronger (s1 < s2) and
plays a lower equilibrium cutoff strategy (x1 < x2). For example, if cb = 1 < c◦, then
the equilibrium is x = (1.281, 1.383).
The example above illustrates a simple but important point. In games that are
not quasi-symmetric, the relative bidders’ strength is not self-evident. Two games
that only differ in the (symmetric) participation cost can generate different strength
rankings and different predictions on which bidder would participate more often.
2. Subsidized participation. Suppose two asymmetric bidders whose valuations
follow a GPD with shape parameter κ = 0. Bidder 1 is characterized by (σ1, c1) =
(1, 1) and bidder 2 by (σ2, c2) = (2, 2). That is, bidder 2’s valuation FOSD bidder 1’s
valuation, but bidder 1 has a lower participation cost. Situations like this may arise
in a procurement auction when bidder 2 is a large firm and bidder 1 is a small (local)
firm with subsidized participation. As before, the model is not quasi-symmetric and
existing results do not apply.
We can use the notion of strength to characterize the equilibria in this game. In this
example, bidder 1 is stronger than bidder 2, as s1 = 1.73 < 2.24 = s2. Consequently,
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(a) c∗ as a function of µ when σ = 1
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(b) c∗ as a function of σ when µ = 1
Figure 3.3: Sufficiency with Log-Normal distribution
in a herculean equilibrium, bidder 1 plays a lower cutoff. In this case, x = (x1, x2) =
(1.398, 2.511). Because both distributions are concave, this is the unique equilibrium
of the game. Notice that x1 < s1 < s2 < x2. That is, the equilibrium cutoff strategies
are “farther apart” than the strength values. This feature not only holds in this
example, but in any herculean equilibrium with two types of bidders. This property
can be useful when estimating auction models, as it can reduce the computing power
necessary to find the equilibrium cutoffs. In particular, the strength of the weak
bidder provides a lower bound for its cutoff and the strength of the strong bidder
provides an upper bound.
3. Uniqueness under a log-normal distribution. To illustrate the intuition be-
hind the sufficient condition for uniqueness (3.7), consider the case with two symmet-
ric bidders under Log-normal valuations with parameters (µ, σ).12 This distribution
is not concave, therefore existing results in the literature do not apply. By Lemma
12. A Log-normal distribution with parameters (µ, σ) has mean exp(µ+ σ
2
2 ) and median exp(µ).
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4, however, we can find a participation cost c∗ that is sufficiently high, so that the
sufficient condition (3.7) holds.
Figure 3.3 depicts the threshold c∗ and the mass of valuations below c∗, as a function
of µ and σ. Panel (a) shows that c∗ increases in µ. This means that for distributions
with higher medians, the minimum participation cost that guarantees uniqueness is
higher. Notice, however, that the proportion of valuations below the entry costs is
independent of µ. This observation implies that, under Log-normality, whether a
game has a unique equilibrium only depends on the standard error of the distribution
and the participation cost. To further understand the previous point, we show the
relation between c∗ and σ when µ = 1. Panel (b) shows that the relation between c∗
and σ is non-monotonic. In particular, c∗ is maximal at 3.6493 when σ = .3507. This
implies that any game with c∗ > 3.6493 has a unique equilibrium, for any value of σ.
When σ > .3507, c∗ decreases with σ. Notice that the proportion of valuations below
the entry costs is not independent of σ. The larger the variance of the distribution,
the less demanding the condition for uniqueness becomes. In contrast, as σ → 0, the
mass of valuations above c∗ converges to zero. That is, as the game converges to a
complete information game—where equilibrium multiplicity is known to exists (c.f.,
Levin and Smith, 1994)—the sufficient condition for uniqueness is never met.
3.4.2 Herculean equilibrium for two groups of bidders
We now extend our previous results to environments with more than two bidders.
Suppose first that there are two groups of bidders, say groups 1 and 2. Each group
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g consists of mg bidders characterized by pairs (Fg, cg), for g = 1, 2. Without loss of
generality, assume that bidders in group 1 are stronger than those in group 2 (s1 ≤ s2).
Although bidders are symmetric within each group, the degree of asymmetry of the
distribution of valuation or participation costs across groups is unrestricted. The
two-group model is especially useful in applied work when bidders are divided by
exogenous factors into two groups, such as incumbency (incumbent vs entrant) or
size (small vs large). Examples of papers studying participation—not necessarily in
the context of second price auctions—in environments with two groups of players
include Athey et al. (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Roberts and Sweeting
(2013) among many others.
Proposition 4 (Two-groups equilibria). There always exists a herculean equilibrium.
Every herculean equilibrium is characterized by the cutoffs x1 ≤ x2 that jointly solve
x1F1(x1)
m1−1F2(x2)












Moreover, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game and, thus,
efficient if for each bidder i
Fi(v) ≥ vfi(v) for every v ≥ min{ck}k 6=i. (3.10)
Proposition 4 generalizes Proposition 3 to the case in which there is more than
one bidder in each group of bidders. The main difference between conditions (3.10)
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and (3.7) is that, with more than one opponent, the range of valuations under which
the condition has to hold needs to include the participation cost of every opponent,
including opponents within the same group.
Condition (3.10) for bidder i in the two-groups scenario differs from (3.7) (in the
two-bidders scenario) when there is more than one bidder in i’s group. In this case,
the condition also has to hold for valuations above ci, which might be lower than
the cost of the other group. This is because the uniqueness proof has two steps.
The first step shows that symmetric bidders—that is, bidders belonging to the same
group—play symmetric strategies in equilibrium, so we can restrict our attention to
group-symmetric strategies. This step only involves best-responses of bidders in i’s
group, making use of condition (3.10) starting at ci. The second step shows that
among the group-symmetric class of strategies, the only equilibrium is the herculean
one. This step makes use of condition (3.10), for values higher than the other group
entry cost. Finally, it is worth noting that Lemma 4 extends to this environment
without modification.
3.4.3 Robust strength order among bidders
The existence of herculean equilibrium in games with three or more groups of bidders
is linked to the robustness of the ranking provided by strength. In particular, existence
depends on whether the strength order between two bidders depends on the behavior
of other bidders.
Consider a scenario with three bidders such that s1 < s2 < s3. The construction
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of strength assumes symmetric behavior among bidders. Suppose instead that bidder
3 is constrained to participate at some given cutoff x̂3. Given this restriction, we
can recalculate the strength of bidders 1 and 2 and find a reversal in their strength
order. This reversal is associated with non-existence of herculean equilibrium. To
illustrate this, suppose we constructed best-response cutoffs for bidders 1 and 2, as a
function of bidder 3’s cutoff. Because s1 < s2, the initially constructed cutoffs satisfy
x1(s3) < x2(s3). For different values of x3, for instance at x3 = x̂3, the strength order
between bidders 1 and 2 reverses, reversing their best responses; i.e., x1(x̂3) > x2(x̂3).
In order to establish our existence and uniqueness results, we need to impose further
structure to guarantee the robustness of strength. The next definition and lemma are
instrumental to that purpose.




ydGi(y) = ci (3.11)
where Gi(v) =
∏
k 6=i Fk(max{v, ck}) is the probability that bidder i obtains the object
when her valuation is v and other bidders participate in the auction for valuations
above their participation cost.
The value of vi is well defined.13 It provides an upper bound to bidder i’s set of
feasible best responses. The cutoff vi corresponds to bidder i’s best response assuming
that the other bidders always enter whenever their valuations are above their entry
13. It is well defined, as the left hand side of (3.11) is strictly increasing in vi, starts from zero
when vi = 0, and is unbounded above due to the finite expectation assumption.
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costs; i.e., vi is i’s participation cutoff under the highest level of feasible competition.
Lemma 5 (Robust strength order). Let c = min{ci}ni=1 and v = max{vi}ni=1. Suppose
that for any two bidders i and j, with i < j, the following condition holds:
Fi(v)ci ≤ Fj(v)cj for all v ∈ [c, v]. (3.12)
Then, bidders are ordered by strength with bidder 1 being the strongest bidder.
The set of models satisfying condition (3.12) includes quasi-symmetric games as
particular cases. Condition (3.12) further extends the existing literature in partic-
ipation in quasi-symmetric environments in two ways. First, it allows distribution
functions that cross and allows for cost orders that do not coincide with distribution
orders. Second, the condition does not restrict bidders to belong to one of two groups.
In particular, if condition (3.12) holds with equality for some bidders, the condition
allows for an arbitrary number of (strictly ordered) groups of bidders, with each group
having an arbitrary number of members.
Example. To illustrate that models satisfying condition (3.12) might not be quasi-
symmetric, consider a scenario in which bidders valuations belong to the Exponenti-
ated distribution family; i.e., Fi(x) = F (x)θi for any F satisfying our assumptions and
θi > 0. Observe that bidder i FOSD j if and only if θi > θj.14 Suppose θi > θj, then
using v we find that every ci ≤ cjF (v)θj−θi satisfies condition (3.12). In particular,
the game is not quasi-symmetric whenever ci ∈ (cj, cjF (v)θj−θi ], as firm i first order
14. This example includes quasi-symmetric environments when two bidders i < j satisfy ci < cj
but θi = θj or when ci = cj but θi > θj .
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stochastically dominates j but has a higher participation cost.
Proposition 5 (n potential bidders). Under condition (3.12), a herculean equilibrium
always exits. Furthermore, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the
game and, therefore, ex-ante efficient if
Fi(v) ≥ vfi(v) for all v ∈ [c, v]. (3.13)
Proposition 5 is neither a particular case, nor a generalization of our previous
results. On the one hand, the proposition extends existence and uniqueness of her-
culean equilibrium to the case with n potential bidders. On the other hand, the
proposition requires condition (3.12) to hold whereas previous propositions do not.
The proposition generalizes the existence-of-equilibrium result in Miralles (2008), who
studied ‘intuitive’ equilibria in a scenario with n-bidders ordered by FOSD and sym-
metric participation costs. More importantly, it extends those findings to a larger set
of models and show, as in the previous scenarios, that our weak form of concavity
is sufficient to guarantee equilibrium uniqueness and efficient outcomes. As before,
Lemma 4 applies without modification.
3.5 On the Importance of Bidder Heterogeneity
In previous sections we emphasized that our results apply to environments that al-
low for more bidder heterogeneity than quasi-symmetric models. Here, we highlight
the importance of allowing this type of heterogeneity. In particular, we show that
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quasi-symmetric models restrict the relation between observable outcomes and restrict
bidder behavior under (exogenous) changes in competition.
Equilibrium, Revenues, and Entry probability In this section, we show that
quasi-symmetric models limit the relation between the bidders’ behavior—i.e., their
participation cutoffs—and observed outcomes, such as the bidders’ profitability and
participation probability. For ease of exposition, we present the results with two
bidders, but they could easily be extended to an arbitrary number of bidders.
In precise terms, we study the relationship between: (i) the cutoff strategies, xi;
(ii) the ex-ante probability of participating in the auction, 1 − Fi(xi); and (iii) the
ex-ante expected payoff of each bidder; which, for a given vector of cutoffs strategies











That is, for each valuation vi under which bidder i participates (i.e., for each vi > xi),
the expected payoff of participating in the auction, weighted by the probability that
vi occurs.
The following proposition characterizes the relationship between these three ob-
jects as a function of the game’s degree of bidder heterogeneity.
Proposition 6 (Cutoffs and revenue ranking).
1. In a symmetric game, a bidder playing a lower cutoff obtains higher (expected)
payoffs and is more likely to participate.
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2. In quasi-symmetric games where bidders play herculean equilibria, a bidder play-
ing a lower cutoff obtains higher payoffs and is more likely to participate.
3. With general forms of bidder heterogeneity, cutoff, participation-probability, and
payoff rankings may not coincide in a herculean equilibria.
Consider a situation in which the data shows that distributions are concave, so
that a unique equilibrium exists, and one bidder participates in an auction more often
than another, but overall receives lower expected payoffs. Proposition 6 shows that
symmetric and quasi-symmetric models cannot account for this type of behavior. The
behavior, however, can be accommodated if more degree of bidder heterogeneity is
allowed.
In quasi-symmetric games, when bidders play a herculean equilibrium, payoffs,
cutoffs and participation probabilities are always ordered in the same way; i.e., bid-
ders with lower cutoffs are more likely to participate and receive higher expected
profits. To see the intuition behind this result, consider an environment in which
bidders are quasi-symmetric in costs. In a herculean equilibrium, the low-cost bidder
plays the lower cutoff, which implies—due to bidders having symmetric distributions
of valuations—that she participates with higher probability. Suppose, for the sake
of argument, that both bidders play the same cutoff strategy. Because the stronger
bidder has a lower participation costs and bidders have symmetric distribution of
valuations, the stronger bidder would receive a higher expected payoff . This payoff
order gets reinforced in equilibrium. Bidders participate whenever they have positive
expected payoffs and the strong (low-cost) bidder participates at a larger range of
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valuations, obtaining even higher profits than the weaker bidder.15 This construction
strongly relies on quasi-symmetry. Once we allow for general forms of bidder asym-
metries, the relation breaks even within the herculean equilibrium class, as shown in
the examples below.
Example. Recall example 1 from section 3.4.1. There, bidders are not ordered by
FOSD as bidder 2’s CDF is a mean preserving spread of bidder 1’s. When the partic-
ipation cost is equal to c◦, bidders are equally strong (si = v◦). Because the CDFs are
concave, the unique equilibrium is given by the symmetric cutoffs equal to the bidders’
strength (xi = v◦). The expected payoff of bidder 2, however, is greater than the ex-
pected payoff of bidder 1. Using equation (3.14), we obtain (U1, U2) = (0.103, 0.185).
This means that although bidders’ cutoffs are not ranked, their expected profits are.
The intuition in this scenario follows from F2(v) < F1(v) for every v > v◦. Relative
to bidder 1, bidder 2’s valuations (distributed according to F2(v)) are skewed to the
right tail of the distribution, whereas their expected payment price (distributed ac-
cording to F1(v)) is skewed towards the left (see Figure 3.2.(a)). In other words, for
valuations greater than v◦, bidder 2’s conditional distribution of valuations FOSD the
bidder 1’s conditional distribution.
Beginning from the previous example, we construct an equilibrium in which bidder 1
receives a lower expected payoff than bidder 2, despite playing a lower participation
cutoff and having a higher participation probability. By decreasing bidder 1’s partic-
15. Similar reasoning applies to quasi-symmetric games with FOSD distributions. If both bidders
were to play the same participation cutoff, the stronger bidder would participate more often and
receive a higher expected payoff due to FOSD. In a herculean equilibrium, the stronger bidder plays
a lower cutoff, participating more often and obtaining even higher expected payoffs.
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ipation cost, bidder 1 becomes stronger than bidder 2 and will play a lower cutoff in
the unique equilibrium of the game. By continuity, if the decrease in bidder 1’s cost
is small, we can construct an equilibrium with said characteristics. Take for example
(c1, c2) = (1.9, c
◦), then bidder 1 is stronger and plays a lower cutoff—in this case
x = (2.1327, 2.2196)—but also receives lower expected payoffs (U1, U2) = (1.11, 1.83).
At a cutoff equal to v◦, both bidders are equally likely to enter. Thus, x1 < v◦ < x2
implies that bidder 1 is simultaneously more likely to participate and receive a lower
expected payoff.
Finally, to show that cutoff order need not coincide with entry-probability order,
modify the participation costs to (c1, c2) = (1.1, 1). In this scenario, bidder 1 plays a
higher entry cutoff x1 = 1.434 > 1.313 = x2 while also participating more frequently
1− F1(x1) = .238 > .234 = 1− F2(x2).
Number of Competitors and Equilibrium Behavior We now discuss how an
(exogenous) increase in the number of competitors generate different equilibrium pre-
dictions in quasi-symmetric and non-quasi-symmetric models. In particular, Lemma 6
below shows that, in non-quasi-symmetric models, increasing the number of competi-
tors may change the relative strength position among existing bidders. Whereas, in
quasi-symmetric models, this reversal cannot occur.
Lemma 6. Adding a potential bidder to the game does not affect the existing strength-
order among quasi-symmetric bidders but might change the order if bidders are not
quasi-symmetric.
















(b) General bidder heterogeneity.
Figure 3.4: Competition and Strength.
petition. Consider a baseline scenario with two asymmetric bidders with symmetric
participation costs c. Suppose that bidder 1 is stronger than bidder 2 and, for sim-
plicity, that F1(x) and F2(x) are concave so that a unique equilibrium exists. Because
bidder 1 is stronger, it plays a lower participation cutoff than bidder 2. Using the
definition of strength in equation (3.5), under symmetric participation costs, the
strength of bidder 1 in a game with two bidders is given by s1F2(s1) = c. In Figure
3.4.(a), s1 is solved by the intersection of the curve vF2(v) with the horizontal line
c (and analogously for bidder 2). Suppose a new potential bidder j joins the game.
When the third bidder is added to the game, the strength of bidder 1 is determined by
s̄1F2(s̄1)Fj(s̄1) = c. To simplify comparison with the case of two bidders, we rearrange
the previous equations that define the strength of bidder 1 as s̄1F2(s̄1) = c/Fj(s̄1). In
Figure 3.4.(a), s̄1 can be computed by the intersection of the curve vF2(v) and the
curve c/Fj(v) (and analogously for bidder 2).
Figure 3.4 shows how strength varies in two different scenarios. Panel (a) depicts a
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situation in which bidders are ordered by FOSD (a quasi-symmetric game). Panel (b)
shows a scenario without this restriction. Notice how in Panel (a) the two functions
vFi(v) never cross. However, without the FOSD restriction the two functions may
cross in general. Intuitively, this means that adding a competitor in quasi-symmetric
games does not alter the relative strength of existing bidders. In Panel (a), bidder 1
is always stronger than bidder 2. Whereas, in non-quasi-symmetric games, increased
competition may affect the relative strength of bidders. As shown by Panel (b), bidder
1 is stronger in a two bidder scenario. But bidder 2 becomes stronger when a new
potential bidder is added to the game, reversing equilibrium behavior among existing
bidders.
3.6 Extensions and Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss some assumptions in the model and extend our
analysis in two important directions: scenarios with a reservation price and in which
bidders are only partially informed about their valuation before making their partic-
ipation decisions. The proofs in this section are relegated to the online Appendix.
Participation Costs In the model, participation costs could represent participa-
tion fees charged by the auctioneer, the cost of preparing and submitting a bid, the
opportunity cost of attending the auction or, travel costs to the auction site. In all
these cases, our results are a starting point for auction design with costly participa-
tion and heterogeneous agents (c.f. Celik and Yilankaya, 2009; Menezes and Monteiro,
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2000; Moreno and Wooders, 2011, who study the case of symmetric agents).
Reserve Prices For ease in exposition we assumed throughout the paper that there
is no reserve price. The notion of strength and our uniqueness result, however, can
be easily extended to this setting. For simplicity we present results in a two-bidders
context. Following similar steps, however, results can be generalized to environments
with more than two bidders.
Assume that the auction has a reservation price of r ≥ 0. We start by adapting
the notion of strength to reflect the existence of the reserve price. In a scenario with
two potential bidders, the strength of bidder i is the unique number that solves:
(si − r)Fj(si) = ci. (3.15)
As before, the strength of bidder i is defined as the unique symmetric strategy profile
in which bidder i is best responding. The main difference with respect to the previous
definition in equation (3.5) is that now the symmetric strategy profile takes into
account the reserve price. Letting bidder 1 being the strong bidder of the game, our
main results in the context of a reserve price is:
Proposition 7 (Existence and uniqueness with reserve price). There always exists a
herculean equilibrium. Every herculean equilibria is characterized by cutoffs x1 ≤ x2
that jointly solve
(x1 − r)F2(x2) = c1 and x2F1(x2)− rF1(x1)−
∫ x2
x1
vdF1(v) = c2. (3.16)
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A herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game if for both bidders
Fi(v) ≥ vfi(v) for all v > r + cj. (3.17)
We can see from the proposition above that the existence of a reserve price weakens
our sufficient condition for uniqueness. The lower bound for participating in the
auction is now r+ ci. A higher reservation price acts as an increase in the entry costs
and, by Lemma 4, it becomes more likely that condition (3.17) is satisfied.
Partially Informed Bidders Thus far, we have studied environments in which
bidders are perfectly informed about their valuations before making participation
decisions. More generally, however, bidders could be partially informed about their
valuations and only learn their true valuation after paying the participation cost. This
model, also called the selective entry model, has been used in empirical applications by
Gentry and Li (2014), Sweeting and Bhattacharya (2015), and Roberts and Sweeting
(2016). We now show how our methodologies and results can be extended to this
framework.
Consider the two bidder scenario of Section 3.4.1. Suppose that the valuation of
bidder i is now given by Vi = viεi, where the signal vi is observed before the par-
ticipation decision and the noise εi is observed after paying the participation cost
but before submitting a bid. We maintain our distributional assumptions over vi and
assume that εi is independent from vi, distributed according to Φi, an atomless dis-
tribution with full support over R+, and E(εi) = 1. At one extreme of selective entry
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models, is Levin and Smith (1994) where bidders are only informed after participat-
ing; i.e., vi is degenerate at some point, conveying no private information. At the
other extreme is Samuelson (1985) and our previous framework, in which bidders are
fully and privately informed about their type before participating into the auction;
i.e., εi is degenerate at 1.
For a given realization of the signal vi, when bidder i is the sole participant in the
auction, its interim expected payoff—that is, the expected payoff of bidder i right
after the participation decisions have been (simultaneously) made, but before bidders




Similarly, for a given realization of signals v = (v1, v2), the interim expected payoff












where, after a change in variables, Φj(s/vj) is the distribution of bidder j’s bid,
conditional on observing the signal vj.
We can use the objects above to define the bidder’s strength. Notice that strength
is an object defined ex-ante. Therefore, strength is defined using the structure of the
first signal, taking into account expectations over the second signal. For a given game




πi(si, vj)dFj(vj) = ci. (3.19)
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The equation above finds the signal si that makes bidder i indifferent to participate
in the auction when their opponent plays a cutoff strategy si.16 The first term is
bidder i’s payoff when she is the sole entrant. In this case, bidder i’s expected payoff
matches her first signal, si, times the probability that bidder j does not participate
when bidder j plays a cutoff equal to si, Fj(si). The second term includes the cases
where bidder j participates; i.e., vj > si. For each realization of j’s signal, bidder
i’s expected payoff is given by equation (3.18). The expression integrates over every
possible realization of vj.
We say that bidder i is stronger than j if si < sj. It can be readily verified that
the left-hand side of (3.19) is strictly increasing and unbounded above; i.e., strength
is well defined. As before, strength elicits a bidder’s ability to endure competition by
computing the symmetric strategy that makes each bidder indifferent between par-
ticipating and not. A bidder with a lower value of strength si is willing to participate
at a lower valuation. Without loss of generality, let bidder 1 be the strongest bidder
of the game. The following proposition characterizes equilibrium in general selective
entry models.
Proposition 8 (Partially informed bidders). There always exists an herculean equi-




πi (xi, y) dFj (y) = ci.
16. Recall that in the partially-informed-bidder model vi is a signal and Vi = viεi is the valuation.
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A herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game if for both bidders
Fi(v) ≥ vfi(v) for all v > min{c1, c2}. (3.20)
In this case, the weak concavity of the signal vi distribution is also a sufficient
condition for equilibrium uniqueness. Although the distributions of noise (Φi) do not
show up in our sufficient condition, they may still affect the existence of multiplicity of
equilibria in scenarios in which the distribution of signals (Fi) is not concave. Finally,
observe that condition (3.20) is a bit stronger than (3.7). This is due to the non-linear
relation that now exists between vi and Fj when the other bidder participates.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this article we generalized existing results about second-price auctions with par-
ticipation costs by allowing heterogeneity both in distributions of valuations and in
participation costs. We developed the concept of strength, which uses bidders’ public
characteristics—here, distributions of valuations and participation costs—to rank bid-
ders according to their ability to endure competition. We showed that an equilibrium
with cutoffs ordered by strength—called herculean equilibrium— exists in situations
of applied interest. Moreover, when the distributions of valuations are concave, we
showed that the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game. Because
there is always an ex-ante efficient equilibrium, when the conditions for uniqueness
hold, the herculean equilibrium is both ex-ante efficient and the unique equilibrium
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of the game.
We believe that the methodology developed here can be extended to study second-
price auctions with more general environments such as interdependent or affiliated
values. Our methodology can also be extended to auction settings in which the
auction designer creates endogenous heterogeneity, including when a bid handicap is
imposed on a subset of bidders during the bidding stage (e.g., bid preference programs
for entrants). The tools developed in this article can be applied to estimate optimal
participation fees and to compare revenue from participation fees and reserve prices.
We regard such models as promising avenues for future research.
3.A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
This section presents the proofs omitted from the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any τ−i. Because i’s utility is linear in τi, it is a
best response to participate with probability 1 whenever there is a positive payoff of
doing so. Hence, it is sufficient to show that, conditional on bidder i participating in
the auction (τi(v) = 1), i’s utility crosses zero at a singleton point and from below.







with respect to v we
obtain that dui/dv = Gi(v) > 0 for all v > 0, which implies that i’s utility is strictly
increasing in v. By the finite expectation assumption on Fi, ui is unbounded above in
v. Therefore, because ui(τi = 1, τ−i, 0) < 0, there exist a unique best response which
is given by the unique value of v that solves ui(τi = 1, τ−i, v) = 0. 
96
Proof of Lemma 2. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be a profile of cutoff strategies. Denote
bidder i’s expected utility of participating in the auction when her valuation is v, and
the opponents play the cutoffs x−i by ui(0,x−i, v). Lemma 1 shows that bidder i’s
best response to x−i is given by the unique valuation xi satisfying ui(0,x−i, xi) =
0. In particular, using equation (3.1) when every opponent uses a cutoff strategy,
ui(0,x−i, xi) = 0 is equivalent to equation (3.3) which proves the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We establish that the conditions of Brouwer fixed-point
theorem are meet. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be a collection of cutoffs. By Lemma 1,
bidder i’s best response to the profile of strategies x−i is given by the unique valuation
v that solves ui(0,x−i, v) = 0. Since Fi is atomless and has full support, bidder i’s best
response is continuous in each of the opponent cutoffs. Moreover, since ui(0,x−i, v)
is increasing in the opponents’ cutoffs, the lowest utility for bidder i is achieved when
each opponent participates with certainty (i.e., x−i = 0−i). Let Ki be valuation of
bidder i that satisfies ui(0, Ki) = 0. Hence, the vector of best responses is a continuous
mapping from the compact and convex set×ni=1[0, Ki] to itself and all conditions of
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem are meet, proving existence of equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) where, without loss of generality,
we order the bidders identities from the lowest cutoff chosen by the planer, x1, to the
highest, xn. Differentiating (3.4) with respect to xi we obtain












Observing that dΩk(v,x−k)/dxi = fi(xi)
∏
` 6=k,i F`(max{v, x`}) if v ≤ xi and zero

















Corner solutions are not welfare maximizing as, when we take xi = 0, Wxi(0,x−i) > 0
for all x−i; and limxi→∞Wxi(xi,x−i) < 0 due to the unboundedness of xiΩi(x). There-
fore, an interior maximum exists, which is characterized by a value of xi satisfying
Wxi(x) = 0. The term inside the parenthesis in equation (3.21) is equal to zero when-
ever condition (3.3) holds.17 Therefore, we conclude that there exists a cutoff equi-
librium that is ex-ante efficient. Moreover, since every equilibrium satisfies Wxi = 0,
they are a critical point of W . Finally, because Wxi,xi(x) = −fi(xi)Ωi(x) < 0, the
critical point cannot be a minimum.18 Thus, every equilibria is either a local maximal
or a saddle point. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Both situations are particular cases of the proof of Lemma 5.

Proof of Proposition 3. See Proposition 4 in the case m1 = m2 = 1. 
















`=1, 6̀=j F`(s). Then, re-arrange the summation in (3.21) so that the
limits of the integral are consecutive cutoffs (i.e., from xk to xk+1) instead of xk to xi.
18. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of both statements make use that a concave
differentiable function is bounded above by its first-order Taylor approximation; i.e.,
for every x and y such that x > y
F (x)− F (y) ≥ (x− y)f(x). (3.22)
The first claim follows, from taking y = 0 and using F (0) = 0. For the second
statement, let y in (3.22) be inflection point under which Fi(v) becomes concave.
Because of concavity, fi(x) is non increasing for every x ≥ y. Because Fi is bounded
above (by 1), fi(x) converges to zero as x goes to infinity. Thus, the cost cj > y
such that condition (3.7) holds is implicitly given by Fi(y) = fi(cj)y. Then for every
x ≥ cj we have: Fi(x) ≥ xfi(x) + Fi(y)− yfi(x) ≥ xfi(x). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Begin by observing that equations (3.8) and (3.9) define
an equilibrium as they correspond to equation (3.3) for the case in which bidders play
symmetrically within group.
Existence. By construction. If s1 = s2 = s there is a herculean equilibrium with




The function g(x) > c1 and represents the cutoff that bidders in group 1 have to
play so that condition (3.8) is satisfied when everyone in group 2 plays the cutoff
x2 = x. Observe that g(x) is strictly decreasing in x and satisfies g(s1) = s1. Define
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The function h(x) is continuous and corresponds to the payoffs that a member of
group 2 obtains by playing the cutoff x2 = x when all other members of group 2 play
x and all members of group 1 respond by playing x1 = g(x). A herculean equilibrium
exists if there is x∗ such that h(x∗) = 0 and x∗ > g(x∗). The next two claims prove
the result.
Claim 1. x∗ ∈ (s1,∞) is necessary and sufficient for x1 < x2.
Proof. Because g(x) is weakly decreasing in x and g(s1) = s1, x1 = g(x∗) < x∗ = x2
if and only if x∗ ∈ (s1,∞). 
Claim 2. h (s1) < 0 and h(x) is unbounded above.
Proof. Group 2 being weak (i.e., s1 < s2 ) implies
h(s1) = s1F1(s1)
m1F2(s1)
m2−1 − c2 < s2F1(s2)m1F2(s2)m2−1 − c2 = 0.
On the other hand, h(x) is unbounded above as xF1(x)m1F2(x)m2−1 is unbounded
and the finite expectation assumption. 
By the intermediate value theorem, Claim 2 plus continuity imply that there exists
x∗ ∈ (s1,∞) such that h(x∗) = 0. On the other hand, h(x∗) = 0 holds if and only if
equations (3.8) and (3.9) are satisfied. Therefore, by Claim 1, we have a herculean
equilibrium with x1 = g(x∗) and x2 = x∗.
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Uniqueness. From Lemma 9 in the Auxiliary Results section of the appendix we know
that, under condition (3.10), symmetric bidders must play symmetric cutoffs. We
need to show that there is no other herculean equilibrium, and that no non-herculean
equilibria exists.
Claim 3. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. In a herculean equilibrium bidders are ordered by strength, thus we have
to show there is no other equilibrium such that x1 < x2 and equations (3.8) and
(3.9) hold; i.e., there exists a unique x∗ > s1 such that h(x∗) = 0. It is sufficient






















Because F2(x)m2−1 > 0, it is sufficient to show that the term in braces is non-negative
for all x ≥ s1. Implicitly differentiating g(x)
g′(x) = − m2g(x)F1(g(x))



























It is shown that a lower bound for the expression above is always positive. Max-





m1 in the integral. Using condition (3.10), maximize the subtracting
term in the second square brackets by substituting F1(g(x)) for g(x)f1(g(x)) in the
denominator (recall that g(x) > c1). Then, equation (3.23) becomes
F1(x)








where x ≥ g(x) for x ≥ s1, and f2(x)/F2(x) ≤ x−1 were used to obtain the inequality.
Hence the lower bound of (3.23) is non-negative if and only if x ≥ g(x), which is true
as x ≥ s1. 
Claim 4. There is no equilibrium in which strong bidders play a higher cutoff than
weak bidders.
Proof. To prove that the only equilibrium is the herculean, suppose we have a non-
herculean equilibrium. By Lemma 9, in the Auxiliary Results section, symmetric
bidders must play symmetric cutoffs under condition (3.10). Thus, the only possibility
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The function ḡ(x) is decreasing in x, satisfies ḡ(s2) = s2, and represents the cutoff
that group 2 has to play so that condition (3.8) is satisfied when everyone in group 1
plays the cutoff x1 = x. The continuous function h̄(x) corresponds to the payoffs that
a member of group 1 obtains by playing the cutoff x1 = x when all other members of
group 1 play x and all members of group 2 respond by playing x2 = ḡ(x). We show
that there is no x such that x1 = x > ḡ(x) = x2 and h̄(x) = 0, which implies that
condition (3.9) does not hold and no non-herculean equilibrium exists.
Observe that x > ḡ(x) if and only if x ∈ (s2,∞) and that s1 < s2 implies that
h̄(s2) = s2F1(s2)
m1−1F2(s2)
m2 − c1 > s1F1(s1)m1−1F2(s1)m2 − c1 = 0.
By an analogous argument given in Claim 3, condition (3.10) implies h̄′(x) > 0, and
h̄(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (s2,∞). Therefore, there is no x > s2 such that h̄(x) = 0 and,
by Lemma 2, no non-herculean equilibrium exists.  
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Proof of Lemma 5. By definition of i’s strength si
∏
j 6=i Fj(si) = ci. Equation (3.12)
implies ci+1Fi+1(si)/Fi(si) > ci. Substituting for ci on the RHS of i’s strength and
rearranging: si
∏
j 6=i+1 Fj(si) < ci+1. Since the LHS is increasing in s, si+1 > si. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Existence. For a given vector v = (v1, . . . , vn), and
following equation (3.2), define the family of functions hni (v) = Ani ri(vi)− ci.19 This
family of functions will be used in the proof of existence and uniqueness. Start by
ordering bidders by strength, with bidder 1 being the strongest and n the weakest.
By Lemma 2 a herculean equilibrium x = (x1, . . . , xn) exists if and only if hni (v) = 0
for all i. We construct x recursively. Let ṽi = (vi, . . . , vn) represent the elements of
v in the ith and higher positions.
Start constructing x1. For any vector ṽ2, define x1(ṽ2) to be the value of v1 that
solves hn1 (v1, ṽ2) = 0; i.e., x1(ṽ2) = c1/An1 . We now construct x2 recursively, by using
the constructed x1(ṽ2). By substituting x1(ṽ2) in for the values of v1 in hn2 (v), we
can write hn2 (v) as a function of ṽ2 only. That is, hn2 (ṽ2) = An2r2(ṽ2)− c2 where
r2(ṽ




is the revenue function r2(v2) after replacing the function x1(ṽ2) for the value of v1.
The finite expectation assumption implies that hn2 (v2, ṽ3) is unbounded above in v2.
Define v̂2 to be the largest value of v2 that satisfies v̂2 = x1(v̂2, ṽ3). Observe that v̂2
always exists, as v2 ∈ R+ and x1(v2, ṽ3) is a continuous function of v2 with range in
19. Recall that, for a given v, vi = (v1, v2, . . . , vi), Ani =
∏n
j>i Fj(vj) and ri(v
i) is given by (3.2).
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(c1, v1). Also, for every v2 > v̂2, v2 > x1(v2, ṽ3). Otherwise, v2 and x1(v2, ṽ3) would
cross again and v̂2 wasn’t the largest point in which they cross.
Using v̂2 = x1(v̂2, ṽ3) = c1/(F2(v̂2)An2 ), we find hn2 (v̂2, ṽ3) = c1F1(v̂2)/F2(v̂2)− c2.
If the bidders are equally strong; i.e., condition (3.12) holds with equality, hn2 (v̂2, ṽ3) =
0. Then, we can define x2(ṽ3) = v̂2. If bidder 2 is strictly weaker, condition
(3.12) implies, hn2 (v̂2, ṽ3) < 0. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there
exists x2(ṽ3) > v̂2 such that hn2 (x2(ṽ3), ṽ3) = 0. Because x2(ṽ3) > v̂2, we have
x2(ṽ
3) > x1(x2(ṽ
3), ṽ3). Observe that by replacing v2 = x2(ṽ3) into x1(ṽ2), we have
written both x1 and x2 as functions of ṽ3. Finally, by construction, the order be-
tween x1(ṽ3) and x2(ṽ3) is robust to any values of ṽ3, implying that the order will
not reverse when constructing cutoffs for weaker firms (though, the actual values of
x1 and x2 do change when we change ṽ3).
Suppose we have shown that, for any vector ṽi, x1(ṽi) ≤ x2(ṽi) ≤ · · · ≤ xi−1(ṽi)
(strict whenever sk−1 < sk). For each k ≤ i, xk(ṽi) has been recursively constructed
by finding a value vk solving hnk(vk, ṽk+1) = 0—which gives us xk(ṽk+1)—and, for
every j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , i − 1}, by replacing the solution of higher cutoffs xj(ṽj+1)
into xk(ṽk+1). We show that there exists xi(ṽi+1) ≥ xi−1(xi(ṽi+1), ṽi+1) (strict if




i−1. Substituting the vector of solutions xi−1 we can write
hni (v) as hni (ṽi) = Ani ri(ṽi)− ci. Because of the finite expectation assumption, hni (ṽi)
is unbounded above in vi. Take v̂i to be the largest value of vi that satisfies v̂i =
xi−1(v̂i, ṽ
i+1). This value exists by the same argument given to find v̂2 and it also
satisfies vi > xi−1(vi, ṽi+1) for vi > v̂i. Using v̂i = xi−1(v̂i, ṽi+1) and Lemma 8.2 (see
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the Auxiliary Result section) we know20
ri(v̂i, ṽ




Then, using the property ri−1(xi−1(ṽi), ṽi) = ci−1/Ani−1 and v̂i = xi−1(v̂i, ṽi+1), we
can write hni (v̂i, ṽi+1) = ci−1Fi−1(v̂i)/Fi(v̂i) − ci. If bidders i − 1 and i are equally
strong, hni (v̂i, ṽi+1) = 0 by condition (3.12) and we can define xi(ṽi+1) = v̂i. If bidder
i is strictly weaker than i− 1, condition (3.12) implies hni (v̂i, ṽi+1) < 0. Then, by the
intermediate value theorem, there exists xi(ṽi+1) > v̂i such that hni (xi(ṽi+1), ṽi+1) =
0. Finally, because xi(ṽi+1) > v̂i , we have xi(ṽi+1) > xi−1(xi(ṽi+1), ṽi+1). Once
again, the order between the cutoffs will be independent of the construction of cutoffs
above. 
Uniqueness: Preliminaries. This proof uses induction. We begin by outlining the
main argument. We order bidders from strongest to weakest. Define Hnk : Rn → Rk
to be the function equal to hni (v) (defined in the existence proof above) in the ith ≤ k
dimension. Fix a value k, by the existence proof we know there exists recursively
defined functions xk : Rn−k → Rk satisfying Hnk (xk(ṽk+1), ṽk+1) = 0. For any i ≤ k,
20. The equation above uses the recursion notation. The formulation from the lemma is
ri(x
i−2, xi−1(v̂i, ṽ
































Using this equation and the implicit function theorem, we can write the vector of




















, Rk = (r1(x1), r2(x



















2)f2(x2) B3(x3) · · · r3(x3) fk(xk)Fk(xk)
...
...








3)f3(x2) · · · Bk(xk)

.
If Mk is invertible, the the solution to (3.25) is given by:
Dk = −M−1k Rkfk+1(vk+1)/Fk+1(vk+1). (3.26)
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We will show thatMk is invertible. Then, using (3.26), we show that dhkk(vk)/dvk > 0.
This implies that hkk(vk) single crosses zero, and xk is uniquely defined. In words, in
a game with n = k bidders, in which every cutoff xk−1(vk) has been recursively
constructed as a function of vk, bidder k has a unique best response. Furthermore,
we will show that dhkk(vk)/dvk > 0 also implies dhnk(vk, ṽk+1)/dvk > 0 for any n > k
and any vector ṽk+1. This implies that in every game with n > k bidders, for any
ṽk+1, bidder k has a unique best response.21 Then, by the induction argument, each
step of the construction xk(ṽk) is uniquely defined and the herculean equilibrium is
unique.
Claim 5. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. Fix a step k and assume there is n ≥ k + 1 bidders. For that given n, let
xk(ṽk+1) to be the vector of functions constructed until step k in the recursion in
the existence proof above. For any positive vector ṽk+2, we need to show that there
is a unique value of xk+1 that solves hnk+1(xk+1, ṽk+2) = 0. In particular, we show
dhnk+1(vk+1, ṽ






where dk = (Ak1r1(x1)f1(x1), Ak2r2(x2)f2(x2), . . ., Akkrk(xk)fk(xk)). Using (3.26), if
21. Notice that this does not imply that for each n > k, bidder k’s best response function is the
same across different n.
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where qk = dkM−1k Rk. Because A
n
k+1 > 0 for all n ≥ k + 1, it is sufficient to
show that the parenthesis (which corresponds to dhk+1k+1(vk+1)/dvk+1) is positive for all
relevant values of vk+1. We show the previous statement and the invertibility of Mk
by induction.
Observe hn1 (v) = An1v1, thus dhn1 (v)/dv1 > 0 and bidder 1 has a unique best re-
sponse for any n ≥ 1 (given by x1(ṽ2) = c1/An1 ). For bidder 2, observeM1 = B1(x1) =
1 is invertible and q1 = (x1)2f1(x1) is well defined. Then, B2(v2)− q1f2(v2)/F2(v2) =
F1(v2) − (x1)2f1(x1)f2(v2)/F2(v2). Using condition (3.13) twice, x1F1(x1)/v2 is an
upper bound for the subtracting term. Since, by construction, we are interested in
v2 ≥ x1, B2(v2)− q1f2(v2)/F2(v2) > 0.
Suppose we have shown thatMj−1 is invertible and Bj(xj)−qj−1fj(xj)/Fj(xj) > 0
for all j ≤ k. Let lk = (Bk(xk)− qk−1fk(xk)/Fk(xk))−1 and observe that lk > 0 by




 and M−1k =
 O − fk(xk)Fk(xk)pk(M−1k−1Rk−1)
−lk(dk−1M−1k−1) lk








k−1), and the inverse ofMk is well defined.
We need to show Bk+1(vk+1) − qkfk+1(vk+1)/Fk+1(vk+1) > 0. Observing that Rk =
(Rk−1, rk(x
k))T , dk = (dk−1Fk(xk), rk(xk)fk(xk)), and using the definition ofM−1k and
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lk we can write:
qk = Fk(xk)qk−1 + fk(xk) (rk(x
k)− qk−1)2
/
(Bk(xk)− qk−1fk(xk)/Fk(xk)) , (3.27)













> (rk − qk−1)2
where Bk+1(vk+1) = Bk(vk+1)Fk(vk+1) was used. By the existence proof we are only
interested in vk+1 ≥ xi; using this condition, that Bk(v) is decreasing in v, and
condition (3.13) we find that (Bk(xk)xk − qk−1)2 is a lower bound for the LHS of the
expression above. Lemma 8.1 shows Bi(xk)xk ≥ rk(xk). Thus we just need to show
that Bk(xk)xk− qk−1 ≥ 0, which is done by proving rk(xk)− qk−1 ≥ 0. We do this by
induction. Since q0 is not defined, we begin with i = 2. Using integration by parts
r2(x








where condition (3.13) was used in the last step. Suppose we have shown rj(xj) ≥ qj−1













Lemma 8.2 shows ri+1(xi+1)/Fi(xi) ≥ ri(xi). By induction hypothesis ri(xi) ≥ qi−1
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The result follows from condition (3.13) and Lemma 8.1. Thus ri+1(xi+1) ≥
qi, which proves dhk+1k+1(vk+1)/dvk+1 > 0 for all vk+1 ≥ xk. Notice that this result
implies dhnk+1(vk+1, ṽk+2)/dvk+1 > 0 for all ṽk+2 and a unique herculean equilibrium
exists. 
Claim 6. There is no non-herculean equilibria.
Proof. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be an ordered vector of equilibrium cutoffs. beginning
from the lower cutoff, let i be the first bidder to play a smaller cutoffs than a stronger
bidder i+1; i.e., xi < xi+1 but si > si+1. In other words, every bidder k ≤ i have their
cutoffs in the same order as their strength. Because of this, we can use our recursive
construction in the existence proof and our induction argument in the uniqueness
proof up to bidder i, so that best responses are uniquely defined for any vector x̄i+1
that bidders may play.
Let’s analyze hni+1(v). Because hni (xi, ṽi+1) = 0 we know ri(xi, ṽi+1) = ci/Ani . Sub-
stituting the vector of solutions xi we can write hni+1(v) as hni+1(ṽi+1) = Ani+1ri+1(ṽi+1)−
ci+1. Take vi+1 to be value of that satisfies vi+1 = xi(vi+1, ṽi+2) and notice that
Lemma 8.2 implies ri+1(xi, ṽi+2) = Fi(xi)ri(xi, xi, ṽi+2). Then, using ri(xi, ṽi+1) =
ci/A
n
i , we can write hni+1(xi, ṽi+2) = ciFi(xi)/Fi+1(xi) − ci+1 which is positive under
(3.12) and the condition that bidder i+ 1 is stronger than bidder i. We need to show
that there is no v∗i+1 > xi such that hni+1(v∗i+1, ṽi+2) = 0. This follows from the proof
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of uniqueness as condition (3.13) implies dhni+1(vi+1, ṽi+2)/dvi+1 > 0 for v∗i+1 > xi,
which implies the result.  
Proof of Proposition 6. Define the ex-ante expected payoff of bidder i under the
















(v − c)dF (v) sym.
∫ x2
x1






Γ1(v, x2)f1(v)− Γ2(v, x1)f2(v)dv FOSD
where Γi(v, x) = xF3−i(x) +
∫ v
x
F3−i(s)ds − c which is increasing in v and x and
positive if the value of x corresponds to an equilibrium cutoff for bidder i.22 The first
case corresponds to symmetric bidders (Fi(v) = F (v) and ci = c for all i). Since in
equilibrium x1F (x2) = c1, U1(x) > U2(x) whenever x1 < x2. Thus, in a symmetric
game, cutoff order implies expected payoff order. Similarly, for the second case, in
a herculean equilibrium in which bidders are ordered by costs (c2 > c1) and using
the same argument above, bidders expected payoff are ordered. Lastly, in the third
case, when bidders play a herculean equilibrium and bidders are ordered by first order
stochastic dominance (F1(v) ≤ F2(v) for all v) we have that Γ1(v, x) ≥ Γ2(v, x) for
22. Integration by parts was used to obtain Γi(v, x)
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where the first inequality follows from the change in identity and herculean cutoffs
(x1 < x2), and the last inequality follows from integrating monotonic functions under
stochastic dominance. Which proves that ∆ > 0 in the three cases. For the order in
the participation probability notice that when the distribution are symmetric, cutoff
order and probability order are equivalent. In a herculean equilibrium x1 < x2 if and
only if F1 FOSD F2. Thus, F1(x1) < F1(x2) ≤ F2(x2) and the order follows. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Pick two quasi-symmetric bidders, say 1 and 2, such that
s1 < s2. Suppose we add a new potential bidder j. Let αi(v) =
∏
k 6=i Fk(v) which
includes bidder j. αi(v) is strictly increasing in v. For cost order: s1 < s2 implies
c1 < c2 and α1(v) = α2(v). Then, using (3.5), s1α1(s1) = c1 < c2 = s2α2(s2), which
implies s1 < s2 and the strength-order is preserved. For FOSD: s1 < s2 implies
c1 = c2 = c and α1(v) > α2(v). Then s1α1(s1) = c = s2α2(s2), which implies s1 < s2
and strength order is preserved. For an example of strength reversal for non-quasi-
symmetric bidders see the main text. 
3.B Auxiliary Results
Lemma 7. If a differentiable function f(x) satisfies xf ′(x) ≤ f(x) for x > c, then,
for every x > c, f(x)/x is weakly decreasing in x.
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Proof. Define φ(x) = f(x)/x. Then, φ′(x) = (f ′(x)x−f(x))/x2, which is non-positive
by the condition. 
Lemma 8. Let (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be an ordered vector from smallest, x1, to largest, xn.
Then, the following properties hold.
1. xiBi(xi) ≥ ri(xi) and strict if exists j < i such that xj < xj+1.
2. ri(xi) > Fi−1(xi−1)ri−1(xi−1) and with equality if xi = xi−1.
Proof. Recall the definition of ri(xi) in equation (3.2). For the first claim simply









which is strictly positive if
there exists a bidder j < i such that xj < xi or zero otherwise. For the second claim
we show that ri(xi) = Fi−1(xi−1)ri−1(xi−1) +
∫ xi
xi−1
Bi(s)ds, which proofs the claim.
Rewriting (3.2):
ri−1(x













Integrating by parts the last term we obtain:
ri−1(x













Since, by definition, Bi(xi−1) = Bi−1(xi−1)Fi−1(xi−1), the result follows. 
Lemma 9. Symmetric bidders with concave CDF’s must play symmetric equilibrium
cutoffs.
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Proof. By contradiction. W.l.o.g. order bidders identities in terms of their cutoff
order, with bidder 1 being the bidder with the lower cutoff. Suppose there exists an
equilibrium such that bidders q < p are symmetric; i.e., Fq = Fp = G and cq = cp = c,




















































We show that a strict lower bound for the right-hand side of (3.29) is non-negative,
a contradiction to (3.29). The first summation is strictly positive, we take a lower
bound of this summation by taking a lower bound of its integrals in three steps: (i)
for the terms in the first product (` < q), replace F`(y) by F`(xq); (ii) substitute
G(y) by G(xq) and; (iii) for the terms in the second product (ranging from q + 1 to













∅ = 1 and x0 = 0.
24. The strict inequality is guaranteed by taking G(xq) as lower bound of G(y) over the range of
integration xq to xp with xq < xp.
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Now we construct an upper bound to the subtracting term in (3.29) by substituting

























Since xj ≤ xj+1, the summation in the previous expression is over non-positive terms.
We can obtain an upper bound by replacing the summation with zero. Then, our








Because the products are positive, the previous expression is non-negative if and only
if G(xq)/xq > G(xp)/xp. The result follows from condition (3.10), Lemma 7 and
xq < xp. 
3.C Additional Appendix































k=i+1 Fk(xk) and Bi(v) =
∏























where Ai−1j Bj+1(xj+1) = A
i−1




and multiplying ri(xi) by Ani , we obtain (OA 1). 
Proof of Proposition 7. We begin by proving existence of a herculean equilibrium.
Suppose that both bidders are equally strong (s1 = s2 = s). Set x1 = x2 = s and
observe that equations in (3.16) hold and a equilibrium exists.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that s1 < s2; i.e., bidder 1 is the strong bidder of the game.
We construct an equilibrium where x1 < x2. Define g(v) = r + c1/F2(v) to be the
equilibrium cutoff played by bidder 1 when bidder 2 plays x2 = v. Observe that
g(v) > r and g′(v) = − (g(v)− r) f2(v)/F2(v) < 0. Define the function h : [s1,∞)→
R by
h (v) = vF1 (v)− rF1(g (v))−
∫ v
g(v)
xf1 (x) dx− c2
which is a continuous function of v. The function h(v) represents bidder 2’s revenue
of drawing valuation v when she plays a cutoff x2 = v and 1 plays the cutoff x1 =
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g(v). To have a herculean equilibrium we need a value x2 satisfying h(x2) = 0 and
x2 > g(x2). The next two claims prove the result.
Claim 7. x2 ∈ (s1,∞) is necessary and sufficient to have herculean cutoffs.
Proof. Observe that g(v) is weakly decreasing in v and, using equation (3.15), g(s1) =
s1. Therefore, x2 > g(x2) if and only if x2 ∈ (s1,∞). 
Claim 8. h (s1) < 0 and h (v) is unbounded above.
Proof. Bidder 2 being weak (s1 < s2) implies
h(s1) = (s1 − r)F1(s1)− c2 < (s2 − r)F1(s2)− c2 = 0.
On the other hand, h(v) is unbounded above as vF1(v) is unbounded and the finite
expectation assumption. 
Claim 8 plus continuity imply that there exists x∗ > s1 such that h(x∗) = 0. On
the other hand, h(x∗) = 0 holds if and only if equations (3.16) are satisfied. Therefore,
x1 = g(x
∗) and x2 = x∗, constitute a herculean equilibrium.
Now we prove uniqueness. We begin by showing that among the herculean class
the equilibrium is unique. Then we extend the uniqueness result among all equilibria.
In order to have a unique equilibrium in the herculean class it is sufficient to show
that h′(v) > 0 for all v > s1, so that h(v) single crosses zero at x∗ from below.
Differentiating and then using g′(v)
h′(v) = F1(v) + g





We show that a lower bound for h′(v) is positive. Using 0 < g(v) − r < g(v), that





Since we are only interested in v ≥ s1, Claim 7 implies v > g(v). Thus h′(v) > 0
proving uniqueness withing the herculean class.25
To prove that the only equilibrium is the herculean, suppose we have a non-
herculean equilibrium; i.e., x1 ≥ x2. Define ḡ(v) = r+ c2/F1(v) to be the equilibrium
cutoff played by bidder 2 when bidder 1 plays x1 = v, and let
h̄ (v) = vF2 (v)− rF2(ḡ(v))−
∫ v
ḡ(v)
xf2 (x) dx− c1
represent bidder 1’s revenue of drawing valuation v when she plays a cutoff x1 = v and
2 plays the cutoff x2 = ḡ(x1). As before, because ḡ(s2) = s2 and ḡ(v) being decreasing,
in order to have an non-herculean equilibrium h̄ has to be defined on [s2,∞). Now
observe that h̄ (s2) = (s2 − r)F2 (s2) − c1 > 0. By repeating the argument above
h̄′(v) > 0 and h̄(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (s2,∞), so there is no x∗ such that h̄ (x∗) = 0 and
no non-herculean equilibrium exists. 
Lemma 11. For any x, y ∈ R++, the function πi(x, y) defined by equation (3.18)
satisfies: (i) πi(x, y) < x; (ii) πi(0, y) = 0; and (iii) π′i(x, y) > 0.26
25. Observe that uniqueness within the herculean class needs a weaker condition than (3.17). In
particular, it needs that the weak player satisfies vf2(v) ≤ F2(v) for v > s1 but s1 > r + c1.
26. Where prime denotes derivative with respect the first dimension.
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Proof. For the first claim, notice that equation (3.18) satisfies







where the first inequality follows from taking the subtracting term to zero and the
second inequality by making Φj(viεi/vj) equal to 1 and integrating. The second claim
follows from simply takin x = 0 in equation (3.18). For the last claim, take Leibnitz












which is positive as it is the integral of positive functions on a positive support. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Preliminaries : Suppose first that s1 = s2 = s. Then,
by the definition of strength, we know that x1 = x2 = s corresponds to a herculean
equilibrium. Henceforth, assume without loss of generality that s1 < s2. Define
Hi(x, y) = xFj(y) +
∫ ∞
y
πi (x, v) dFj (v)− ci.
and let g(x) be given by H1(g(x), x) = 0. That is, g(x) corresponds to bidder 1’s
best response to bidder 2, when bidder 2 plays the cutoff strategy x. Using Lemma
11 in the Auxiliary Results section of the appendix, Hi(0, y) = −ci and Hi is strictly
increasing. Because Hi is also unbounded above in x, the value g(x) exists and is
uniquely defined. Notice that Hi(x, y) is differentiable and strictly increasing in y.27
27. dHi/dy = fj(y)[x− πi(x, y)] but πi(x, y) < x for every value of y by Lemma 11.
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Claim 9. g(s1) = s1 and
0 > g′(x) > −f2(x)g(x)
F2(x)
. (3.30)
Proof. First part follows by definition of strength. For the inequalities in equation
(3.30), we use implicit differentiation:






By Lemma 11, g′(x) < 0, as for any x and y, π1(x, y) < x and π′(x, y) > 0. For
the lower bound of g′(x) observe that the integral term in the denominator is pos-
itive. Then, taking the subtracting term in the numerator and the integral in the
denominator to zero gives the lower bound. 
Existence of herculean equilibrium: Define the continuous function h : [s1,∞)→ R
by h(x) ≡ H2(x, g(x)). This function corresponds to the expected payoff of bidder
2 when bidder 1 best-responds to x; i.e., bidder 1 plays x1 = g(x). Define x2 to be
the value satisfying h(x2) = 0, we prove that x2 exists and that it is an herculean
equilibrium. Observe that, because g(s1) = s1 and g(x) is weakly decreasing in x,
x2 ∈ (s1,∞) is necessary and sufficient for x1 < x2 (herculean cutoffs). Also, because
h(x) is unbounded above in x, we prove existence by showing h(s1) < 0. Because
s1 < s2, we have h(s1) = H2(s1, s1) < H2(s2, s2) = 0, were the inequality follows Hi
being increasing in both dimensions; and the equality follows from the definition of
strength. Therefore, a herculean equilibrium exists.
Uniqueness: The uniqueness proof is divided into two claims. Condition (3.20)
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used in each of them.
Claim 10. There exists a unique herculean equilibrium.
Proof. To prove uniqueness within the herculean class, it is shown that h′(x) > 0 so
that h(x) single-crosses zero from below. The derivative of h(x) is:
h′(x) = F1 (g(x)) +
∫ ∞
g(x)
π′2 (x, y) dFj(y) + g
′(x)f1 (g(x)) [x− π2(x, g(x))].
The first two terms of h′(x) are positive. The term containing g′(x) is negative.
We show that a lower bound of h′(x) is positive. For the lower bound, we take the
subtracting term in the square brackets to zero and replace the lower bound (3.30),
and find










π′2(x, y)dF1(y) > 0
Condition (3.20) implies that the term in parenthesis is positive and the results fol-
lows. 
Claim 11. There is no equilibrium in which the strong bidder plays a higher cutoff
than the weak bidder.
Proof. To prove that the only equilibrium is the herculean equilibrium, suppose we
have a non-herculean equilibrium—i.e., x1 > x2 but s1 < s2. Define ḡ(x) to be the
function that satisfies H2(ḡ(x), x) = 0. ḡ(x) corresponds to bidder 2’s best-response
to the cutoff of bidder 1 when x1 = x. As before, ḡ(x) is well defined. Similarly,
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following the steps of Claim 9, it can be shown: ḡ(s2) = s2, ḡ′(x) < 0, and that ḡ′(x)




Define the continuous function h̄(x) = H1(x, ḡ(x)) which corresponds to bidder
1’s expected profits of participating with signal x when bidder 2 best-responds to x.
We show that there is no x such that x1 = x > ḡ(x) = x2 and h̄(x) = 0; i.e., no
non-herculean equilibrium exists. Begin by observing that x > ḡ(x) if and only if
x ∈ (s2,∞). Because H1(x, y) in increasing in both dimensions, H1(s, s) is strictly
increasing in s. Then, by the definition of strength and by bidder 2 being the weak
bidder,
0 = H1(s1, s1) < H1(s2, s2) = H1(s2, ḡ(s2)) = h̄(s2).
Following analogous steps to those in Claim 10, which requires to use the lower bound
(3.31), it is possible to show that h̄′(x) > 0. Then, because h̄(s2) > 0 and h̄′(x) > 0,
h̄(x) never crosses zero when x > s2 and the result holds.  
Proposition 9. In two-bidder symmetric games in which the distributions of valua-
tions are convex for valuations v ∈ [0, v̄] (see eq. (3.11)), the symmetric equilibrium
is never efficient.
Proof. Campbell (1998) shows that convexity implies multiple equilibria. Under
symmetric bidder playing a symmetric equilibrium, the Hessian (and its determinant)
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 det(H) = f(x)2(F (x)−xf(x))(F (x)+xf(x)).
Convexity of the distribution function implies xf(x) > F (x). Thus, the determinant
is negative, which implies that the symmetric equilibrium is a saddle point. 
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